China is a major ally and arms supplier of the internationally-isolated junta and has refused to call the coup that ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s government two years ago.

Beijing also backs and arms several ethnic rebel groups along its border with Myanmar, analysts say, some of which have clashed repeatedly with the military in the aftermath of the coup.

The Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) groups seven ethnic outfits, who together can call on tens of thousands of well-armed and well-trained fighters, analysts say.

“We welcome and support China’s involvement to end domestic conflicts happening in Myanmar,” the FPNCC said following the meeting in an autonomous enclave run by the United Wa State Party (UWSP).

With a standing force of around 25,000, the UWSP’s forces are one of the world’s largest non-state militaries.

The FPNCC statement did not give details on what involvement from Beijing it would welcome.

It would “continue working together with the Chinese government to improve the stability of border areas,” it added.

On-off fighting along the border before the coup sent thousands fleeing into China, and analysts say Beijing has recently been pressuring the northern ethnic rebel groups to stay out of the post-coup conflict.

But many FPNCC members have offered shelter and weapons training to the “People’s Defence Forces” (PDF) that sprung up across the country to fight back against the coup.

Last year a military airstrike on a concert held by the Kachin Independence Army in northern Kachin state killed around 50 people and wounded more than 70, the rebels said.

Several projects in Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative are slated to run through northern Myanmar and link China’s landlocked Yunnan province with the Indian Ocean.

China’s special envoy to Myanmar has met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing at least twice since he was appointed in December and has also met ethnic rebel leaders for talks.

Beijing’s diplomats are also mediating between Myanmar and Bangladesh for a pilot programme to repatriate Rohingya refugees who fled a 2017 military crackdown now subject to a UN genocide investigation.

Repatriations would start “very soon,” Beijing’s ambassador to Dhaka, Yao Wen, told reporters on Tuesday.

© Agence France-Presse

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This expression is widely used to highlight the importance of fostering good relations with neighbours and to maintain peace. And when looking at Vietnam and China’s strained relations, the proverb holds wisdom.

China has become increasingly aggressive towards Vietnam in recent years, economically and militarily. Despite a common political ideology, China is using its financial prowess and economic might to compete with Vietnam in gaining influence with Cambodia and Laos. For China, it’s all about taking steps leading to more control over the Mekong River Basin.

As China continues to extend its influence on Laos and Cambodia with projects such as the Belt Road Forum, an international political and economic cooperation that provides an attractive financial support tool, the Asian superpower’s increasing influence is causing concerns for Vietnam.

If its neighbours side with China, Vietnam will be isolated around its land border, and vulnerable from a geopolitical perspective. The powerful communist country is also unafraid to signal to the international community that its military presence is increasing in strength.

Observers only need to look to the South China Sea dispute to understand China is an active military threat. Vietnam and China have long-standing commercial ties, but the territorial dispute has strained their complex relationship.

There are steps Vietnam could take to avoid further conflict with China, yet this would require some new diplomatic and policy changes with neighbouring Laos and Cambodia. 

Cambodia 

Vietnam is currently the fifth largest foreign investor in Cambodia. Following a $25 million investment towards building the Kingdom’s National Assembly in 2021, the two countries marked the 55th anniversary of diplomatic relations in June with a $3 million investment from Vietnam into a Cambodian rehabilitation centre. 

The relationship between the two nations has been growing in areas including trade, culture, and most recently, pandemic aid. In addition to medical equipment, the Vietnamese state provided around $300,000 to the Kingdom in Covid-19 financial aid.

But Cambodia has become closer to China after receiving huge development investments. 

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen opposed ASEAN’s support for The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration on South China Sea in June because he was afraid it might cause friction between the bloc and China.

The decision to allow China to build facilities at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand concerned other countries in the region. 

Some see this as the further step in a Chinese strategic expansion of the Indo-Pacific where countries like Laos and Cambodia are supporting China’s ambitions to build a network of military facilities and business infrastructure around the world through its Belt and Road Initiative.

Laos

In contrast, Laos is playing a careful game of balancing powers through its reliance on Chinese funds.  Laos’ foreign debt is currently over $14 billion, 88% of the country’s GDP, and half of this amount is owed to China from previous loans. 

As one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia, turning to Asia’s largest economy is understandable. However, Laos should be careful to avoid falling into a trap of over-reliance. 

Many Belt and Road Initiative loans are agreed at commercial interest rates and carry conditions such as proceeds from natural resource sales. 

Laos’s vision for increased infrastructure amidst a backdrop of rising inflation and economic uncertainty risks creating an unpayable cycle of debt to China. 

Vietnam could potentially dilute China’s influence by stepping in with increased aid to Cambodia and Laos, which could also help build their respective infrastructures and further common beneficial interests. 

Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia could participate in shared schemes to invest in infrastructure, human development, food supply and data sharing to build resilience against natural hazards, including floods, droughts and typhoons. 

Soft power cooperation with China can also play an important part in the Mekong region’s development. 

Scholars and researchers can be sent to China to deepen and develop expertise to bring back to their home countries. China’s involvement creates codependent interests in the stability of the Mekong region, which is also crucial for China’s development. 

People diplomacy is another area in which Vietnam can deepen cooperation with Laos and Cambodia.

Vietnam offers hundreds of scholarships annually for Cambodian students. In return, Cambodia gives 35 scholarships to Vietnamese students to study the Khmer language and culture in Cambodia. After graduation, these students are likely to continue cultural exchanges and events, strengthening the ties between the countries. 

These cultural ambassadors are examples of how people can build bridges and enhance the relationships between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 

Its long history of relations with China has also built a foundation of diplomacy and an understanding of the factors needed to maintain the peace. If there is not any provation with China in the South China Sea region, Vietnam is unlikely to side with other major powers.

Creating more codependent interests will help bind the countries in the region together, preventing the possibility of degraded business ties, reduced diplomacy,  or worse.

Every family has its differences. But if Vietnam is looking for the “nearby brothers” of that well-cited proverb, adopting a unified approach over individual and sometimes competing power dynamics can help strengthen not just Vietnam, but ASEAN as a whole.

Tuyen Tran is a visiting scholar at National Taiwan University and non-resident Fellow at Pacific Forum. Her research interests focus on maritime security, geopolitics in Indo-Pacific and the EU’s integration.

The post Vietnam sits at a crossroad as China expands power and influence appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

China’s increased political, military and economic activity in and around Indonesia in recent years has not been viewed favourably by the Indonesian people, a chilly reception with the potential to hurt relations between the countries. 

Public views of China have worsened since 2011, based on a survey by the Australia-based Lowy Institute conducted in November and December involving 3,000 adults in 33 Indonesian provinces.

The survey shows that while 43% of Indonesians agree with the statement “China’s growth is good for Indonesia,” 60% strongly agree “Indonesia should join forces with other countries to limit China’s influence.” The Asian powerhouse also was deemed a threat during the next decade by 49% of Indonesian respondents.

This plummeting view of China among Indonesians is not surprising considering disagreements over the South China Sea, the economic impact of the Belt and Road Initiative and treatment of the ethnic Uyghur population in China’s Xinjiang region.

Relations between Jakarta and Beijing have expanded significantly in recent years. The ties have not only been dominated by trade and investments, in which China is Indonesia’s most crucial partner, but also in social, cultural and medical spheres. China is currently the biggest vaccine supplier to Indonesia. 

This strong cooperation has made some analysts believe that Indonesia has increasingly become dependent on China. But the closeness between China and Indonesia has been accompanied by reservations about China’s growing penetration in the Archipelago.

The United States is pursuing diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing China’s influence throughout Asia and the Pacific. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a trade bloc of the U.S. and 12 other nations, launched on 23 May with Southeast Asian countries including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Indonesia also signed on.

Indonesia’s growing aversion stems in large part from China’s increasingly confrontational behaviour in the South China Sea. Geographically, Indonesia is directly adjacent to the sea, placing the island nation at the vortex of the conflict that has also drawn in other regional countries taking exception to China’s expanded maritime claims.

Indonesia has the right to claim a small portion of the South China Sea area due to the 321-kilometre (200-mile) radius marking its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) calculated from the coastline of Natuna Island in the northern Riau Islands province. The regulatory policy of the Indonesian EEZ is in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

But the EEZ line drawn based on Natuna Island clashes with China’s Nine Dash Line claim, which claims ownership of 90% of the South China Sea area. ASEAN countries including Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia have firmly rejected China’s unilateral claim and prioritised division of the South China Sea as regulated by the UNCLOS.

The conflict recently has intensified with China asserting its claim to the Indonesian part of the South China Sea. In December, China sent  a letter asking Indonesia to halt oil and gas drilling activities in the Natuna area because China considered this an encroachment on its territory. The Chinese ship Haiyang Dizhi 10 began monitoring the area around Indonesia’s energy exploration block in August.

Undoubtedly, the South China Sea disagreement has boosted the perception of a ‘China threat’ among Indonesians, fostering beliefs that the larger nation to the north aims to dominate Indonesia.

Some Indonesians also view Chinese investments in their country as a form of neo-colonialism. There are increased concerns about job opportunities among local residents and perceptions of preferential treatment for Chinese businesses by the Indonesian government.

This includes amendments in labour regulations to ease the entry of Chinese workers to Indonesia. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Chinese workers were granted entry despite lockdown measures. Chinese nickel smelter investors also have received benefits ranging from tax cuts to reduced import fees on capital equipment. 

These business developments have created feelings of injustice among Indonesians.

There also is fear of potential debt traps. Indonesia’s central bank recently revealed $21 billion of debt to China since June 2021. AidData, a U.S.-based research institute, released data regarding countries that may go into debt to China over incessant infrastructure development in the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Among those, AidData cited Indonesia as having $17 billion in hidden debt.

Indonesia also has decided to budget funds for problematic Chinese projects, including a Jakarta to Bandung high-speed rail project launched in cooperation with Belt and Road in 2015. The spending decision came despite the project’s cost rising to $8 billion. Many in Indonesia fear this debt to China will put the government at risk of default.

China’s unabated repression of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang autonomous region is another cause for disillusionment in Indonesia. Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International have reported Beijing stepped up its inhumane treatment of Uyghurs in recent years through campaigns of mass detention, political indoctrination and forced assimilation.

Beijing’s brutal treatment of Uyghurs has attracted the attention of the international community, including Indonesian Muslims who have condemned China’s Xinjiang policy.

Amnesty International was among nearly 200 organisations to sign an open letter in March urging UN High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet to release a promised report on Xinjiang. Amnesty International also issued an expansive report of its own in June 2021 detailing what the organisation said was evidence of “crimes against humanity” against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The allegations included “imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; and persecution.”

Demonstrations in Indonesia have called on the government to sever ties with China if the latter persists with the harsh policies. Muhammadiyah, a large Indonesian Muslim NGO, issued an open letter in December 2018 condemning Beijing’s treatment of Uyghurs and asking the Chinese government for an explanation. Nahdlatul Ulama, another Islamic organisation, did the same.

While China has employed faith diplomacy towards Indonesian Muslims to co-opt narratives about activity in Xinjiang, the abuse has stoked anti-Chinese sentiment, which is becoming prevalent in Indonesian society.

While China’s political and economic footholds expand in Indonesia, negative perceptions of China have increased. Although these complaints from Indonesians may not end the relationship between the governments, the growing animosity toward China could create an unpleasant environment for Beijing in future dealings with Jakarta. This may drive China to pursue extra soft-power efforts to maintain its positive standing. 

The certainty is that many Indonesians are hopeful the public outcry could be a wakeup call for their government to end preferential treatment towards Beijing and for China to amend some foreign and domestic action, including the most contentious policies on the treatment of Uyghurs and aggression in the South China Sea.

Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is an associate professor and director of the Institute for Global and Strategic Studies at Universitas Islam Indonesia.

The post Indonesians are drawing a hard line on China appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

Hello and welcome back to Anakut!

You might have to think twice about your answer after listening to this latest episode, in which Thina and I venture beyond the digital horizon to a world of state surveillance and cybersecurity.

Our subject for this installment is the National Internet Gateway. No, that’s not another Phnom Penh monument, but rather a Cambodian project now seemingly in the works after Prime Minister Hun Sen made headlines in February by signing an official sub-decree calling for a major rerouting of the country’s internet traffic. The gateway scheme would effectively run all incoming connections to the internet through a single point overseen by the government, a move that would require both an infrastructural overhaul as well as a highly technical team of minders.

The news of the gateway sub-decree, which came with a completion timeline of one year from signing, was quickly met with public anxiety over what many saw as tightening state control over the means of expression. Some observers at the time likened the development as a step toward a restricted version of the internet as maintained by the Chinese government.

The gateway scheme would effectively run all incoming connections to the internet through a single point overseen by the government

Amidst all the speculation, we were left wondering what all of this actually means for internet users in the Kingdom. So this week, we got two fully wired guests to explain it to us. In this episode, you’ll meet Moses Ngeth, a tech commentator, blogger and digital security consultant for civil society organisations. We also had on James Griffiths, the Asia correspondent for the Globe and Mail newspaper and author of The Great Firewall of China, a book that gives us a view of what the internet can look like under firm state control.

This is likely one of our most informative episodes to date. We start with the origins of the gateway sub-decree before moving into the concrete details that Moses has dug up as to what technical aspects this rerouting will include. From there, we move into the comparisons between Cambodia’s emerging internet scheme to the increasingly sophisticated measures the Chinese state has developed since first taking hold of the internet in the 1990s. 

Finally, we talk about the digital culture that could form in this new, more highly monitored digital ecosystem before sharing some tips from the experts on how users can protect themselves online.

I personally found this episode very interesting to record, so I hope you’ll give it a listen. Scroll back up to the top and hit play to catch a glimpse of what life might be on the other side of the gateway.

All episodes of the podcast can be found on our Anakut webpage, Amazon, Apple, Google and Spotify. 

The post The Anakut podcast: Cambodia’s controversial internet gateway appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

They first appeared in December 2020 at the place called Whitsun Reef, a natural formation at the heart of the hotly-contested Spratly Islands, some 35km west off the coast of the Philippines. 

Hua Chunying, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman based in Beijing, told the press late last month that the fishing vessels are simply taking shelter from strong winds – but no one knows for certain why the vessels are there. They’re not fishing, and they haven’t moved much. They just sit, anchored in a stretch of sea claimed by five different nations: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia.  

In other seas, 200 odd fishing vessels may not be much to worry about – in this one, where Chinese ‘fishing militias’ have acted as a vanguard for the state’s territorial goals, a fleet like this was cause enough to scramble the Filipino air force. Now, as jets routinely monitor the fleet, fears are mounting in the Philippines that Chinese leaders are looking to start construction on a new artificial island to further entrench a national claim to the controversial reef.

The search for answers over China’s long-game in these waters is more often linked to lucrative subsea oil and gas deposits, as well as control over a waterway through which a third of the world’s maritime trade flows. But according to Rashid Sumaila, professor of ocean and fisheries economics at the University of British Columbia and director of the Fisheries Economics Research Unit at the UBC Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, perhaps the sea’s most overlooked asset is its living wealth. 

“There’s too much fishing effort there. [China and Southeast Asian nations] need a lot, as there’s a large population [of fish] around the South China Sea. That is where you have the political games being played,” he told the Globe. “We tell [claimants], these fish are so important for the populations.”

As China attempts to consolidate its claims to the sea, long-standing rumours of food insecurity swirl in the country. In August 2020, Chinese President Xi highlighted that Covid-19 had “sounded the alarm” on food waste, later launching the “Clean Plate Campaign” to try to prevent food waste. 

Singaporean defence analyst Andy Wong told the Globe he believed China was looking to increase its grip on the South China Sea due to this food insecurity back home. 

“If China has a problem feeding them from the land then they’re going to turn increasingly to the sea,” Wong said. “[China would take] every single bit of coastal territory and disputed territorial waters in the South China Sea that they can get their hands on, so as to stake claim as to whatever resources they can get.” 

China has some of the most complex and difficult capture fisheries management in the world. But, current capture fisheries management is looking more at the long game, focusing on the intensification of resource conservation and ecological restoration. These efforts will see a slower growth in aquaculture, marine catch and freshwater catch compared to previous decades. 

Data from the commercial fishing transparency group Global Fishing Watch also showed a whopping 18.4% decline in active Chinese fishing vessels and 10.7% fewer fishing hours in 2020 compared to 2018-2019. 

But an apparently shrinking fishing industry hasn’t affected the view from the dinner plate, with the demand for fish still rising. Consumers there are eating more seafood than ever before, making for 21% of animal protein consumed in China compared to a global average of 16%. Government surveys of household consumption have shown a rise in national per capita consumption of seafood from 3.1 kg in 1985, to 11.4 kg in 2016. That figure doesn’t include out-of-home consumption, which could add an extra 35%.

Hongzhou Zhang is a research fellow at Nanyang Technological University who has made a career out of researching and writing about China’s food security, as well as fishing policies and the South China Sea. He explained to the Globe that there is a disconnect between China’s slowing marine and freshwater catch and the rising demand for fish by Chinese consumers. 

“That means that China will either have to import more from the international market, or that Chinese consumers will be forced to consume less [fish], like the case of pork,” said Zhang. “I would say that that is the overall picture, something quite worrying in terms of meat supply, for pork, beef and fishery products.”

Tabitha Grace Mallory, founder and CEO of the China Ocean Institute and an affiliate professor at the University of Washington, explained that China is turning increasingly to imports from foreign countries to feed hungry mouths back home.

This all comes down to China’s growing middle class, who want the kind of higher-price-point seafood found more commonly in foreign waters. That includes more basic fare such as hair tail, squid and croaker, as well as higher-dollar varieties like crabs, lobster and salmon.

“That’s a bit different from a food security issue. People aren’t on the brink of starvation,” Mallory told the Globe. “In the past, people in China would eat very low quality, low-value seafood. Now, consumption patterns have changed.”

Even if food security isn’t a top factor in China’s push to the sea, access to the fishery may be appealing for economic reasons.

Some observers argue China’s long-term interest could be to place itself as the central power in a fishing industry that would ultimately sell fish back to other, displaced claimants of the sea. As China’s maturing economy offers easier work options to fishermen who prefer dry land, Zhang told the Globe a future, Chinese-led industry could include many more crewmen from Southeast Asian nations. Fishermen from the other seafaring nations could end up back on the waters they once sailed, serving on Chinese vessels in contested areas held more securely under Chinese authority.

According to his research, this has led to a rise in labourers from Southeast Asian nations, like Vietnam and the Philippines, appearing on Chinese fishing vessels.

“Local [Chinese] fishers go out for a few years to sea, then they open shops, and they stop wanting to go out,” Zhang said. Over the years, he’s made many trips to fishing villages throughout China, speaking to fishermen to better understand their changing lives. 

“Now [Chinese] labourers can find better opportunities without having to join the fisheries sectors, so now that’s why you see an increase in labourers from Southeast Asian nations, like Vietnam and the Philippines, starting to appear on the Chinese fishing vessels.”  

Zhang believes that this trend will only continue, and also believes that the South China Sea could become a marketplace of fishermen trading fish stock. He said that this is already an area Chinese scholars are pushing for, to promote fishery trade among the claimant states.

China can make some gains in the South China Sea without any interference from the outside. This has been shown across the board. It’s the same as their attitude towards Taiwan and Hong Kong

But signs of cooperation are hard to come by right now. 

The past year has seen China push limits in the contested waters, creating new paramilitary and political-legal actions in the South China Sea, establishing two new administrative districts and enforcing them with naval forces. Fearful of what this would mean for their own access to the waters, the US pushed back against these claims, announcing a “strengthening” of US policy regarding China’s claims in the sea.

Mallory suggests that the recent rise in aggression from China in the South China Sea could be linked to a global preoccupation with the Covid-19 pandemic, with China making the most of having less international attention on the issue. 

“China can make some gains in the South China Sea without any interference from the outside,” said Mallory. “This has been shown across the board. It’s the same as their attitude towards Taiwan and Hong Kong.” 

For Zhang, it’s impossible to explain the Chinese strategy in the disputed sea through just one lens, whether that be food security, resource control or geopolitical opportunism.

“The entire situation of the fishing issue is much more complicated than a single narrative,” he said. “[But] China will still have to catch fish. Whether they like it or not.

The post How much is fish driving Chinese aggression in the South China Sea? appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

Until recently, there has been little to doubt that assessment of Sino-Thai relations, as the relationship has only strengthened since the creation of a closer bond – one based on security cooperation against Vietnam in the 1970s and 80s, relief over Beijing’s decision not to devalue the baht during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, relative silence during Thailand’s May 2014 coup d’état, and increased Thai dependence on Chinese tourists.

Yet because of recent developments, namely the authoritarian crackdown and passage of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong, recent pressures on Taiwan, and relative silence amid the military coup in Myanmar, it is the image of China among the Thai public, rather than its foreign policy with Thailand’s military-backed government, that has come under strain. 

Recent years have seen a growing schism between Thailand’s warm foreign relations with Beijing and rising public anger at the government’s seemingly cozy relationship. The formation of the Milk Tea Alliance this past year has shone a light on a younger generation of Thai’s resistance to Chinese influence in the kingdom, rejecting the notion of a strong cultural bond between the two countries. It is this rising anti-Chinese sentiment that should concern Thai and Chinese policymakers going forward, as a temporary online war of words from netizens has the potential to spill over into something much worse. 

Thais began to regard the influx of Chinese tourists as a negative, with some earning the same “ugly” moniker that had previously been associated with Americans

Interactions with China in Thailand are not always smooth. Before the onset of Covid-19, Chinese tourists became the lifeblood of the Thai tourism industry, accounting for more than 25% of all visitors to the kingdom. Yet Thais began to regard the influx of Chinese tourists as a negative, with some earning the same “ugly” moniker that had previously been associated with Americans. The Thai government has struggled to find a balance between public anger at the behaviour of Chinese tourists and its growing dependence on the revenue they bring in.

Compounding the problem was “zero-dollar” tourism, where Chinese travel agencies would offer cheap tours, with meals and accommodation, offering tourists the luxury of knowing their needs would be taken care of and limiting spending in the wider community. In 2016, the Thai government banned zero-dollar tourism, shutting down several companies and arresting some for money laundering and illegal tours – all with limited success. 

Hostility only grew at the onset of the pandemic, as a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment rippled across Southeast Asia and beyond during the Covid-19 outbreak in early January last year. In February last year, Thai graffiti artist Headache Stencil wrote racist rants against Chinese tourists and reports of anti-Chinese sentiment reached as far north as Chiang Mai. As the coronavirus continued to spread, xenophobic nationalism proliferated online. 

Foreign policy stumbles and increasing interdependence have also amplified Thai animosities toward Beijing. In 2019 for example, concerns arose about a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) high-speed rail project that would connect Nong Khai with Vientiane, Laos and Yunnan Province in southwestern China. Thai newspaper editorials grumbled over the possibilities that this could be another Chinese “debt trap”, with much of the financing in the second phase of the project coming from international loans, of which China stands to benefit the most. 

Little in the way of transparency and accountability were shown by the government, which kept most of the details of the project hidden from the Thai public. The consequences of this lack of transparency are reflected in the statistics, with a poll taken in January 2020 showing that 60% of Southeast Asian respondents reported that they distrusted China, and 40% thought it intended to turn the region into its sphere of influence

While the early days of the Milk Tea Alliance were petty bouts of nationalism and online trolling, the broader movement has become symbolic of some of the frustrations Thais have about China’s formidable presence in the region

But it is the growing Milk Tea Alliance that has increased scrutiny of China within Thailand. 

The Milk Tea Alliance’s early origins came from an online squabble between fans of Vachirawit Chivaaree – or Bright from the Thai drama 2gether: The Series – and Chinese netizens when the actor retweeted photos of skylines in four “countries”, one of which was Hong Kong. When the Chinese responded with tweets insulting Thailand’s king and prime minister, Thai fans were unimpressed. 

It’s a largely leaderless online mechanism that aims to harness international criticism at Chinese authoritarianism in East and Southeast Asia, and it has become a prominent voice in Thailand’s ongoing pro-democracy protests. There is the sense among members of the Alliance – Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and now Myanmar – that each have become victims of Beijing-backed authoritarian regimes or policies, and by proxy, a victim of China itself. 

While the early days of the Milk Tea Alliance were petty bouts of nationalism and online trolling, the broader movement has become symbolic of some of the frustrations Thais – and now people across Southeast Asia, including Myanmar – have about China’s formidable presence in the region. 

The evidence of Beijing’s influence is difficult to ignore. China is Thailand’s largest trading partner, according to the World Bank. The same is true for Myanmar and Cambodia. Even Thailand’s economic growth models, which aim to elevate the country from middle-income status to fully developed by 2037 are contingent upon connections to Beijing, which Prayut hopes will provide a substantial portion of the foreign direct investment required to fund the Eastern Economic Corridor. 

In other words, Thailand’s future is intertwined with that of China. 

But the Milk Tea Alliance is somewhat separated from the realities of economic interdependence. Activists in Asia have increasingly regarded Beijing, like many in the West, as a lingering threat to democratisation and the well-being of existing democratic institutions, as evidenced by the ongoing political, economic, and social integration of Hong Kong into mainland China. 

China’s relative silence following the February 1 military coup d’état in Myanmar has also already set off alarms among Milk Tea activists. China immediately blocked a resolution in the UN Security Council condemning the coup, warning that international pressure or sanctions would only worsen matters in Myanmar. The lack of support or condemnation only reinforces the image of China as recalcitrant in the face of bitter opposition to an unpopular coup. 

It is the image of China which is something that both the Thai and Chinese governments will have to contend with going forward. If the Thai younger generation – much more technologically savvy and politically progressive than previous generations – holds little regard for sentiments of the past, it serves as a stark reminder of a cloudier future. 

At some point in time, Thailand’s public anger will catch up to its foreign relations with China. The signs of this are already showing, when an angry Thai public got the better of an unpopular move by the Thai government to buy two $724 million Chinese submarines amidst the pandemic in August.

This public anger towards China could spillover into more persistent development challenges, such as Thailand’s vulnerability to drought – and its precarious position on the lower Mekong and subject to the political whims of China. Countries bordering the lower Mekong River are at the mercy of Chinese controlled upper Mekong dams – but Thailand, Cambodia, and Lao PDR rarely raise objections due to their cozy relations with Beijing.

But Thailand has already begun to take notice of growing public discontent with Chinese influence on the issue, and in February 2020, the Thai government ended a Chinese-led project that would improve navigation in a section of the Mekong after local residents and conservationists loudly objected over potential environmental impacts. 

All this is to show that Thailand’s relationship with China – mainly the image of Chinese influence within the kingdom – hangs delicately in the balance.

Mark S. Cogan is an Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Kansai Gaidai University in Osaka, Japan. He is a former communications specialist with the United Nations in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.

The post Thailand’s rising tension between public and state relations with China appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

Nevertheless, owing to the inherent limitations of this regional institution, along with the current influence of Covid-19, resorting to ASEAN mechanisms is not the best option if Vietnam hopes to resolve the dispute. Instead, the government should consider bringing the case to international arbitration and upgrading the relationship with the US to a strategic partnership. These stern moves may compel China to curtail its increasing assertiveness. 

The South China Sea is one of the most hotly contested areas in the world, with several claimants within the region disputing territory. But what is notable and worth mentioning is Chinese provocation in recent years. In April last year, amid the spread of the coronavirus, China sunk a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the disputed Paracel Islands, sent the Haiyang Dizhi 8 ship into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, and announced the establishment of new administrative areas near Vietnam’s declared maritime entitlements.

Confronting Chinese assertiveness, Vietnam has been mainly implementing multi-dimensional diplomatic methods for years. To demonstrate, the Vietnamese government endeavours to directly negotiate with China over the dispute and carry out several exchanges of high-level visits. It has also utilised the media to publicly condemn Chinese activities in the South China Sea.

Raising the issue through ASEAN is another strategy applied by Hanoi with the aim of swaying regional opinion in its favour. In fact, in addition to past attempts, Vietnam has brought up the dispute for discussion in the 36th ASEAN Summit and the 53rd Foreign Ministers’ Meeting during its 2020 ASEAN chairmanship.

With a result of a joint statement in June last year calling for full compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Vietnam was expected to lead the region to take a stronger and clearer stance on the South China Sea conundrum. Nonetheless, when taking a deeper look at the diversity and fundamental working principles of ASEAN, one had better not put too much hope on this regional institution. 

ASEAN functions on the norms of non-interference and consensus-building. Hence, with regard to the issues deemed internal, other nations tend to rarely express strong reactions. The Rohingya crisis could be viewed as a prominent example

To begin with, ASEAN is too diverse of an institution to come up with collective action for the South China Sea matter. It consists of ten members with varying levels of economic and military power and a wide range of political regimes. Therefore, to “win the heart and mind” of all members would be almost impossible for Vietnam. What’s more, the institution functions on the norms of non-interference and consensus-building – hence, with regard to issues deemed as internal matters, other nations tend to rarely express strong reactions. The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar could be viewed as a prominent example of this.

From the nature of ASEAN, it is understandable why the region fails to come up with a joint strategy towards the South China Sea conundrum, despite a long and tiring debate between members. Additionally, inside of ASEAN, there are certain nations that possess an intimate and dependent relationship with China, namely Laos and Cambodia, who receive substantial investment and financial aid from Beijing. Also, China remains on the list of crucial trading partners for many other states in the region. As a consequence, opposing China is not considered a favourable policy. This economic reliance will, undoubtedly, influence their desire to take sides in the South China Sea issue. 

The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic has complicated the situation even further. Given the restrictions on social distancing, normal negotiations and consultations between ASEAN members through physical meetings become mostly impossible. Vietnam clearly strives to establish the Code of Conduct as soon as possible, but considering the current situation, there is a high chance that COC discussions will be delayed. This, in turn, accommodates China’s goal of buying time to further expand and consolidate its control over the South China Sea through building military bases.

Still, Vietnam should keep in mind that even if the COC is completed, it will not necessarily change the game. Indeed, many scholars pointed out the potential weaknesses of COC, with Dr Vo Xuan Vinh of the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies at the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences even concluding that the completed version would be “not meaningful”. Will China strictly abide by the established rules? The answer is, worriedly, no.

The US is like-minded with Vietnam regarding the issue of the South China Sea. There were many times when the US policymakers publicly criticised the ‘completely unlawful’ activities of China

Fortunately, Hanoi still has other alternative measures, which could prove far more effective. It is a ripe time for the country to bring the case to the international court whilst strengthening its relationship with the US. 

First, the recommended policy of suing China can bring many benefits to Vietnam. According to Professor Peter Dutton, the decision of the court can bring “clarity over its legal rights to resources in the region” and hence “stop Chinese interference so that Vietnam can move forward with exploitation contracts for its offshore gas and oil deposits”. Moreover, should Vietnam win the case, it can highlight China’s illegal nine-dash line claim and rally more international support for its side. 

Under article 287 of UNCLOS, the maritime dispute can be settled by four courts including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, Annex VII, and Annex VIII. However, if deciding to go to the court, Vietnam should choose Annex VII. This is because of the nature of the dispute between Vietnam and China, which is a dispute over the rights on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf.

With Annex VII, even if the other party, China, does not appear before the court, the court will still proceed if requested, which might be the possible scenario for Vietnam. Since the award would be “final and without appeal” and “complied with by the parties to the dispute”, Vietnam had better consider a lawsuit seriously. In the meantime, Vietnam should prepare persuasive evidence to sue China over article 56, 58, and 77 of UNCLOS on the rights of the coastal State in its EEZ and Continental Shelf in order to increase its likelihood of winning. 

Second, Vietnam should enhance its partnership with the US and consider upgrading the relationship into “strategic comprehensive”. The Vietnamese government might already be considering this partnership given that it was hinted at in the 2019 Viet Nam National Defence White Paper, which stated: “Depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Viet Nam will consider developing necessary, appropriate defence and military relations with other countries.”

Inherently, the US is like-minded with Vietnam regarding the issue of the South China Sea. There were many times when the US policymakers publicly criticised the “completely unlawful” activities of China while calling Vietnam a “cooperative maritime partner”. At the current time, it is a wise choice for Hanoi to seek further support and assistance from Washington. For instance, it can ask for help in enhancing fisheries management, surveillance systems, and law enforcement capabilities. Vietnam should also increase security cooperation through joint exercises and strategic dialogues.

Having a strong partner by its side, Vietnam’s message for China will be more powerful and far-reaching. 

Nguyen Hoang Anh Thu, a senior student majoring in International Relations at Tokyo International University and a research fellow at Vanguard Think Tank for Trans-Pacific Relations (VTT).

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Led by the USS Theodore Roosevelt, the carrier strike group entered the area Saturday, the US Indo-Pacific Command said, the same day Taiwan reported multiple Chinese jets and bombers had flown into its air defense zone.

“It’s great to be in the South China Sea again, conducting routine operations, promoting freedom of the seas, and reassuring allies and partners,” said Rear Admiral Doug Verissimo, commander of Carrier Strike Group Nine.

Beijing lays claims to nearly all of the South China Sea — despite Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam also saying parts belong to them. 

China’s foreign ministry spokesman called the routine US exercises a “show of force and not conducive to the peace and stability of the region”.

The South China Sea is a strategic waterway and also believed to have valuable oil and gas deposits. 

The US operation comes days after Washington said its commitment to Taiwan is “rock-solid”, the first comments from the Biden administration on the democratic island

Beijing has moved aggressively to turn reefs into artificial islands capable of hosting military planes, angering nations which also stake claims in the area.  

The US operation comes days after Washington said its commitment to Taiwan is “rock-solid”, the first comments from the Biden administration on the democratic island.

Taiwan split from China at the end of a civil war in 1949 and exists under the constant threat of invasion by the mainland, whose leaders have vowed to one day take it.

Beijing balks at any official contacts with Taiwan and tries to keep the island diplomatically isolated.

The US remains Taiwan’s most important unofficial ally, however, and is bound by an act of Congress to sell it weapons to defend itself.

President Donald Trump embraced warmer ties with the island as he feuded with China over trade, and his successor is also expected to remain tough on Beijing.

© Agence France-Presse

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An emblematic piece of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a torch bearer for future regional railway lines, the project has proved impervious to the disruption that Covid-19 has wrought and looks set to be completed by December 2021.

The single-track, 400km-long railway will run through 76 tunnels and over 154 bridges, with trains hitting top speeds of up to 160kmh. While that pales in comparison to the high-speed trains north of Laos’ border, for a country with only a 4km stretch of existing railway, the project will prove groundbreaking in the country’s quest to shed the limitations of its landlocked status.

The railway is seen as a vital link of the Chinese BRI dream being played out on its comparatively tiny neighbour. But Laos has its own ambitions at play. The long, mountainous country has embarked on an ambitious railway plan to cheat geography and become ‘land-linked’ with the help of an infrastructure overhaul financed with outside help. 

With the train fast approaching the platform, the tangible benefits of the project remain unclear, more so for those in Vientiane than Beijing. Funded primarily by the BRI’s opaque financing system, the project is a joint venture that is within Laos’ borders, but not of its making. And while railways historically have heralded connectivity and economic benefits for both state and localities, with Laotian demand for the route seemingly not there, scant infrastructure in place to capture revenue and fears of debt defaults for the project, the view is less clear on Laos’ BRI Express.  

Origins and financing 

Other than the existing 4km stretch, Laos has no rail network, explaining the eagerness of which it has approached the railway to Kunming.

“Building railways has long been a goal for Laos, as it missed out on colonial railway infrastructure in the early 20th century,” explained Keith Barney, a senior lecturer at the Crawford School of Public Policy at Australian National University. 

The roots of the project stretch back decades, when the idea of a Kunming-Singapore regional railway was softly proposed at the 1995 ASEAN summit. 

The railway is now being realised within a Chinese framework with Chinese money, Chinese workers and Chinese vision

“Actors within the region have looked at this project and struggled to see the viability of it, but then in steps China,” Scott Morris, co-director of sustainable development finance and a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, told the Globe. “It’s become sort of emblematic of its investment projects under BRI.”

Representatives from China and Laos signed a memorandum of understanding for the project in 2010, six years before workers first broke ground on the initial stretch of railway. The China-Laos partnership, however, is weighted more to the former according to Simon Rowedder, a postdoctoral fellow at the National University of Singapore and member of the Max Weber Foundation Research Group on Borders, Mobility and New Infrastructures. 

“The railway is now being realised within a Chinese framework with Chinese money, Chinese workers and Chinese vision,” Rowedder said.

What’s more, the project’s investment model would subdue much of the economic benefits for Laos at the construction level, with the vast majority of labourers working on the railway being brought in from China.

Morris said the Chinese investment model suggests a series of diminishing returns.

“The entire financial package rests on the use of Chinese firms, so Laos is not feeling the boost maybe as much as it should have done,” Morris explained.

Like similar projects that fall under the BRI’s obfuscated financing umbrella – the railway seems more like a project within Laos, but not by it, or even for it. Morris said investment entities within the BRI template don’t report financial data “in any sort of transparent fashion”, making it difficult to parse out what their funding packages actually consist of.

This was the case for the Kunming-Vientiane railway, which Morris said carried a price-tag beyond what the Laotian government was able to borrow on its own. As a product of that, the financing structure of the project forms a 70-30 ownership split, made up predominantly of Chinese loans and equity investments. The World Bank estimates China’s share of the financing to be $4.11 billion.

“A lot of criticism levelled at BRI goes towards this issue, where you have a government owned-Chinese entity that is taking a majority stake in massive infrastructure,” Morris said. “It’s politically sensitive, but the only way this project was going to get done is with this equity.”

Laos also had to turn to China to help fund its minority stake, taking out a $480 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank, and further $250 million from the government budget, and it will need the railway to generate enough revenue to service the loans, or risk defaulting.

“Even for Laos to fund its minority stake, they needed a huge loan from the Chinese government – which makes it particularly convoluted,” Morris said. 

China’s regional network aspirations

The stretch from Kunming to Vientiane is being built with an eye to the Chinese aspiration of a regional railway network. While not being a direct train, there are hopes that the long-mentioned Kunming-Singapore railway will one day see light. A Thai-Sino high-speed rail line from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima, to eventually link towards the Laotian border, will be officially agreed and signed in October.

The rest of the proposed project has run into more trouble, however, with bilateral agreements to build railways from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur and north to Bangkok long-delayed, and the rest on shaky political ground. It will likely take a number of decades to realise a regional railway network south of Bangkok, if it is ever to happen.

Economically, isolated stretches of rail are not a high priority for nations looking for a return on multi-billion-dollar investments. As such, the Kunming-Vientiane stretch may require an accompanying regional rail network to realise its full potential. 

“At the minimum you need a regional railway network for this stretch of track to make sense,” Morris said. “But then, in such a framework, you have some countries who can reap the rewards while some will miss out.” 

However, Parag Khanna, author of The Future is Asian: Commerce, Conflict & Culture in the 21st Century, believes the very existence of such a railway will see Laos reap the rewards, even if further down the line.

“A fundamental point is that infrastructure does not follow the pattern of strategic ownership,” Khanna explained. “While it can be viewed as a Chinese tool, the bottom-up view is that infrastructure is not linear. It empowers countries to diversify their economies – and with the case of Laos, it can provide it with the economic tools to one day resist the encroachment the railway itself represents.”

Indeed, Laos’ wider rail ambitions can be seen in an extension of the existing 4km line to Vientiane, in which a two-track railway from Savannakhet in the west, to Lao Bao on the border with Vietnam, has been proposed and is awaiting construction. From Lao Bao the railway would then travel across Vietnam, to Dong Ha. 

In late-2019, it was also announced that the Indonesia Railway Development Consortium was planning to build a 400km route from Thakhek in Laos, to Vung Ang Por in Vietnam. 

“No one pays as much attention to this railway, a part of the East-West Economic Corridor between the two countries [Laos and Vietnam],” said Rowedder. “Laos has had to calculate how to pragmatically benefit from its context, so it’s not just a picture of ‘victim-Laos’.”

From a classical development geography perspective, it makes sense that China would seek to incorporate new regions and frontier zones into its economic sphere

That would require the will and vision on the part of Laos to make this new railway network, most importantly the Kunming line, work for its own needs. However, other commentators argue the railway’s commencement may just further solidify Laos’ dependence on China, locking in the smaller country’s role as a transit line for the larger nation. Barney believes China doesn’t just want the railway for its connectivity value, but also its ability to extend influence beyond its borders. 

“From a classical development geography perspective, it makes sense that China would seek to incorporate new regions and frontier zones into its economic sphere,” Barney said. 

Rowedder echoed that sentiment, adding the railway doesn’t just speed up the influx of Chinese capital and investment, but also ties Laos to it. In his view, the project is part of the stirrings of an “economically recovering giant in China, who’s sort of pushing this project through a host with a struggling economy” to advance its own longer-term domestic goals.

Arguably, it’s being built with China’s south west in mind, where a push to open up the region and Yunnan province, levelling it up with the east coast, is underway.

“This western push has been targeted domestically for a while,” Rowedder explained. “There has been long-term planning on how the west of China can benefit from regional connectivity, trade and investment. The railway is a logical extension of what we’ve seen before.”

Domestic boost or a Laotian white elephant?

The project has the potential to be an economic boost for Laos, as well as improving connectivity to China, and further afield, the region. But to ensure success, it must be primed to capture the benefits in order to avoid the railway becoming a white elephant.

“It’s certainly an ambitious state-building project for Laos, but whether it will prove to be a reasoned gamble will depend on what Laos makes of the railroad,” Barney said. “The government seems to be confident that ‘if you build it, they will come’.” 

In the long-term, that doesn’t make for a convincing business plan. 

“The economic impacts that the railways might bring must be observed for more than 10 years,” said Narut Charoensri, a lecturer in international affairs at Chiang Mai University. “We need more evidence-based analyses to measure economic change, in the long-term, for this project.” 

On a recent field research trip to Laos, Rowedder picked up a brochure detailing the apparent economic benefits of the railway. 

“The first thing on the list was income generation from transit fees,” Rowedder recalled. It would be hoped that a $6 billion railway would bring about more than just transit fees. “Laos may have the infrastructure, but without the soft infrastructure to accompany it, it will always remain a venue of ‘transit’.”

The ‘soft’, supporting infrastructure needed to accompany it is central to Laos being able to capture the revenue from the line. Well-maintained feeder roads, storage facilities, efficient border and customs services for passengers and goods, responsive regulatory frameworks and enhanced tourism infrastructure, among other things, are all needed alongside the railway.

It’s an ambitious ticket to punch before the railway’s grand opening, scheduled for 2021. Rowedder, however, noted that the picture on the ground in Laos is different to the prevailing reportage of it. 

“There is optimism and fascination in Laos about this,” he said. “The picture on the ground is more nuanced than what has previously been reported.”

Rowedder explained that while issues remain with land settlements, he found that people he met were excited for the railway, “as long as it didn’t go through their backyard”. 

Before Laos’ apparent ‘railway revolution’ comes the Kunming line, which will act as the guinea pig for similar projects within the region. And with an immense cost, short-term gains seemingly minimal and long-term benefit unclear, once Laos’ shiny new railway gets the green light, the jury will be out whether the economic good was worth the outlay, and whether “if you build it, they will come” really is a credible strategy.

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Low Taek Jho, commonly known as Jho Low, is accused of being the mastermind behind a fraud that saw billions of dollars looted from sovereign wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad. 

The money was used to buy everything from a super yacht to art in a scam that also involved former Malaysian premier Najib Razak, who was convicted in his first 1MDB-linked trial this week.

Malaysian police chief Abdul Hamid Bador said on Wednesday that Low was in the semi-autonomous casino hub of Macau. He has previously been rumoured to be in various locations across the world, from the United Arab Emirates to China.

However, a Chinese embassy spokesperson called the claim “groundless and unacceptable”, saying the country would never “shelter foreign criminals”. 

“The Chinese police have followed and investigated meticulously each and every relevant clue we have received from the Malaysian police,” the spokesperson said in a statement. 

“Unfortunately, no relevant individuals have been found and the Malaysian side has been informed accordingly.”

Low, who held no official position at 1MDB but was believed to wield enormous influence over its operations, has been charged in both Malaysia and the United States over the controversy.

He denies wrongdoing.

Najib’s lawyers accused Low of having tricked the ex-leader, although this claim was rejected by a judge when he found him guilty this week. 

The former premier was sentenced Tuesday to 12 years in jail and fined almost $50 million on corruption charges relating to the scandal, which led to his government’s downfall in 2018.

Najib is currently facing two other trials over the controversy.

© Agence France-Presse

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