Speakers stressed the role of independent news as a “pillar of democracy” in Cambodia and a “fundamental human right” worth defending. The praise bypassed an elephant in the room – the abrupt closure two months ago of the Voice of Democracy (VOD), a prominent daily outlet that specialised in government reporting.

The February crackdown was announced through a Facebook post from Prime Minister Hun Sen. The speed of it sent a chill through the remainder of the independent press, which in the lead up to the July national election has warned of a dissolving media space. But these more existential worries about press freedom found no room on the UN event’s agenda, which focused on promoting journalism training and women in media.

The closure was only questioned by Chak Sopheap, executive director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, on a panel about media developments in the Kingdom.

“I hope the prime minister will generously, compassionately reconsider reopening VOD,” Sopheap said. “If we are truly going to ensure press freedom, we must reconsider if VOD’s actions were wrongful.”

Meas Sophorn, a spokesperson for Cambodia’s Ministry of Information, calmly shook his head as the audience applauded Sopheap’s plea. In the eyes of the ministry, which often directly reflects the views of the prime minister, the closure of a single outlet does not “suffocate the overall press freedom”.

“Press freedom in Cambodia cannot use one unlawful newsroom as the definition of the press freedom space. The closure of the VOD did not slay press freedom in Cambodia,” Sophorn said. “On the other hand, that was a wake-up call for all newsrooms to be responsible for their professional conduct.”

Journalists in the room interpreted the response as a veiled warning. And when directly asked by Southeast Asia Globe about the likelihood of VOD’s reopening, Sophorn advised reporters to “just keep taking pretty photos of Cambodia.”

In the immediate wake of Hun Sen’s closure of VOD, representatives of surviving outlets were wary that the prime minister’s decision seemed to bypass articles of the Law on the Press.

“Until now people question the legality of the shutdown of VOD,” Sopheap said to Globe. “When it comes to these arbitrary decisions from the top leader, people just call for the reversal because debating the legality of the decision is not even helpful.”

When asked about concrete ways to defend the free press, Sopheap laughed with uncertainty.

“Press can not be free when places, like VOD, can be shut down very arbitrarily,” Sopheap said. “We can only hope that the call from many of us can touch the leader’s heart.”

The prime minister’s February order to close VOD followed a seemingly minor news story that quoted a government spokesman as saying it would be acceptable for Hun Sen’s eldest son, military commander Hun Manet, to sign off on an aid package to earthquake-stricken Turkey.

Despite Hun Sen’s denunciations of VOD’s alleged lack of professionalism during his closure order, he urged the outlet’s staff to apply for ministry jobs. Political observers saw this as a tactic to co-opt his perceived opposition. Within two weeks of the shutdown, 26 former employees were hired by various ministries.

The VOD shutdown fits the mould of previous cycles of press crackdowns ahead of national elections.

The year before the 2018 national elections, Hun Sen issued a several-million-dollar unpaid tax claim to the country’s oldest English-language newspaper, effectively closing The Cambodia Daily. The persecution of newspaper employees came in lock-step with further orders for Radio Free Asia and Voice of America to stop broadcasting in Cambodia.

A Reporters Without Borders release on World Press Freedom Day noted Cambodia as one of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region following the trend “where government persecution of independent media has intensified in the run-up to elections that are due to be held in the coming months.”

On Cambodia’s country page, the advocacy organisation praised the free press that flourished until “Hun Sen launched a ruthless war against independent journalism before the 2018 elections.”

While the outcome of the July election is seemingly all but certain in favour of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, the vote is seen as a key moment for the transition of power from father to son. Hun Sen, who has led Cambodia for nearly 40 years, has declared his son as his chosen successor.

On World Press Freedom Day itself on 3 May, the embassies of the U.S. and France hosted an event that was somewhat more candid than the UN. 

Hang Samphors, head of the advocacy group Cambodian Female Journalists, said the government’s impunity will “continue to scare journalists”. This would in turn be “limiting their possibilities, freedom and will to do the job. Making them feel more cautious, fearful for their own safety – inhibiting them from doing their work.”

With the backdrop of a memorial for journalists killed during Cambodia’s civil war, ambassadors from the U.S., France and Japan joined Samphors in sharing concerns over VOD’s shutdown and the state of the free press in the run-up to elections.

“We urge authorities to promote media freedom, ensure that journalists can do their jobs without fear of reprisal,” said U.S. Ambassador W. Patrick Murphy. “We also urge authorities to protect reporters from violence and harassment, not be the source of harassment.”

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To this end, the Myanmar military has demonstrated incredible determination and a willingness to inflict brutality. Many observers understandably assess the regime’s increasing use of air strikes and explicit targeting of civilians as signs of desperation due to depleted and demoralised ground forces.

The current violence comes in the wake of the coup on 1 February 2021 that deposed the recently elected government and ended over ten years of nominal civilian rule.

However, these actions also follow the long-standing four cuts doctrine the Myanmar military has employed elsewhere over many decades of internal conflicts. The essence of this strategy is to cut off access to food, money, potential recruits, and information within areas that oppose central government rule.

The four cuts doctrine is now being directly applied against ethnic Bamar population areas previously relied upon for recruitment and material support, which may signal the Myanmar military’s quasi-religious belief in its centrality to the nation more than desperation.

Indeed, even if the regime is desperate, Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s Commander-In-Chief, and his coalition are likely willing to sacrifice everything to maintain privilege and power.  

In response, the resulting civil war has mobilised citizens across class, ethnic, religious, and geographic divides toward the common goal of ending the regime. The current opposition towards the military is arguably the strongest unifying force in Myanmar’s recent history.  

The Civil Disobedience Movement, which started as a general strike in protest of the coup, drew workers from across the country and various sectors of the economy. Even when met with lethal force, peaceful opposition to the regime has well outlived comparable attempts of the past. Simultaneously, violent opposition has also expanded beyond the long-established claims of Myanmar’s powerful Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) and into traditional military strongholds.

Majority ethnic Bamar areas, notably Magway and Sagaing, are now the sites of intense combat against loosely organised, and often poorly equipped, People’s Defense Forces (PDF), newly formed civilian armed resistance groups, as well as indiscriminate raids, killings, and the burning of civilian homes perpetrated by the regime.

The Myanmar military may not be as desperate as it is determined.

It now faces operational and strategic challenges that have only intensified. Last month saw the effective end of a tenuous ceasefire with the Arakan Army, which seeks autonomous rule in the western Rakhine State and is among the most powerful EAOs. The Myanmar military struggles to make operational gains against the Karen National Union (KNU) in the eastern Karen State bordering Thailand after months of clashes. The KNU is notably one of the oldest EAOs and has been resisting central government rule since shortly after Myanmar’s independence in 1948.

Growing cooperation of some EAOs with the National Unity Government (NUG), which is comprised primarily of members of the prior civilian government now in exile. Collaboration between NUG backed PDFs and well established EAOs signals potential for much greater operational capacity on the part of the opposition.

Most tellingly from a strategic perspective, the Myanmar military appears to be losing people faster than they can be replaced. Considering these challenges, the military’s response, no matter how brutal, are likely insufficient to reestablish the military’s previous widespread dominance.

But the alternative future to a central government victory against the opposition is not necessarily one where a popular, or at least less brutal regime comes to power. The Myanmar military is arguably in the process of becoming one – albeit the best armed –  among many armed factions grappling for territory and resources. 

Nevertheless, the continued survival of opposition across Myanmar’s societal boundaries of ethnicity and geography show the clearest opportunity yet for the emergence of a shared national identity. An identity that, should it survive, may prove to be a critical unifying force driving the nation and its people towards a more stable and prosperous future.

It is critical to consider how such a unifying theme even exists.

For most of Myanmar’s turbulent post-colonial history, it has been its ethnic minorities that have suffered the brunt of successive military regime attempts at consolidating power. This fact has often been easy to dismiss for those in the Bamar dominated heartland who are now suffering what those in Myanmar’s ethnic states have for decades experienced. There is understandable suspicion when it comes to how the NUG led opposition might act if it were to come to power. Growing cooperation suggests this suspicion is gradually being relieved, but there is still much mistrust still to be overcome.

The economic and social damage caused by the double disasters of Covid-19 and the 2021 coup sent millions into poverty and destroyed any future for most citizens. Rampant economic mismanagement in the wake of the coup has destroyed the financial system and made access to critical commodities, including medicines, scarce. Yet, even with daily privations, or perhaps because there is little left to lose, the opposition continues.

It remains easy to assume the current opposition likely won’t succeed, especially when considering the stances taken by regional powers such as China, India, and Thailand in support of the military regime. From a realist perspective in which each nation seeks first to secure its own position, those who continue to support the regime look first to their own interests, and likely back the side perceived as most likely to win.

However, the decision makers could be just as trapped by limited perspectives and narrow framing of facts on the ground as is Min Aung Hlaing and his inner circle. Alternatively, it is important to consider the full policy implications a realist view  toward Myanmar might entail.

Myanmar is historically the source of many transnational problems for the region, ranging from human and narcotics trafficking to providing a safe harbour for separatist movements in conflict with neighbouring governments, especially India.

However, how might these threats emerging from instability and dysfunction, compare to a future threat of a more stable, developing, and increasingly powerful Myanmar?

As the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia, with 45% of its population under 25 and expansive natural resources including hydroelectric potential and fossil fuel reserves, Myanmar could very well become a major regional power.

A stable and developed Myanmar would raise economic prospects across the region. However, it would also threaten Thailand’s central economic position in mainland Southeast Asia.

Thailand continues to endure ongoing political turmoil that appears to share much in common with Min Aung Hlaing’s regime in terms of maintaining power at the expense of political and economic transformation. Keeping Myanmar undeveloped and a source of cheap labour and commodities is a tolerable status quo, even when air raids come dangerously close to provincial Thai citizens.

A more unified Myanmar may prove less amenable to the economic and security interests of India and China when these do not align with the popular will. 

The expansive sanctions and efforts at humanitarian aid delivery made by the United States and others notwithstanding, international efforts continue to stop short of official recognition of the NUG. To be sure, doing so would pose significant diplomatic risk as it would end whatever engagement is possible with the current regime and upset the interests of key partners—especially Thailand.

The national identity taking shape in opposition to the regime demands consideration through both realist and idealistic lenses. From a humanitarian perspective, the growing toll of nearly 30,000 homes burned, thousands of civilians killed, and hundreds of thousands displaced is unconscionable. The crisis drains the credibility of ASEAN, while transnational threats of narcotics and arms trafficking are sure to intensify and undermine regional security.   

Given the many challenges and a lack of action from abroad, the national identity of Myanmar is still uncertain.

But a  ‘wait and see’ approach will keep Myanmar’s future opaque. The damage already done will not be reversed anytime soon. Yet the opportunity for outside powers to support a national identity, one which could lead to stability and prosperity, is unprecedented. Doing so will require openly backing the opposition against the current regime in recognition of a better future. Perhaps for the first time this appears not only possible, but with growing unity, increasingly expected. 

Wayland Blue is a graduate student in the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego focusing on development and security issues in Southeast Asia. He previously worked as the director of research and evaluation for Shade Tree Foundation, a Thailand-based NGO delivering aid and education to Myanmar migrant and refugee families.

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Lèse-majesté, or royal defamation, can still be found in many constitutional monarchies and is supposed to protect the reputation of the head of state. But what sets Thailand apart is the severity of the penalty under the law—also known as Article 112 of the Criminal Code.

Thailand has the harshest royal defamation laws in the world, which punishes offenders with three to 15 years imprisonment. And it has been actively enforced since its inception in 1908 in the Criminal Code.  

Since the military coup in 2006, lèse-majesté has become a perfect political tool for the authorities, as well as ultraconservative citizens, to silence those who criticise the government, the role of the monarchy, or even this law itself. During the post 2014 coup until early 2018, at least 169 people were charged under the lèse-majesté law.

But after receiving heavy international condemnation, the government ceased prosecuting individuals under lèse-majesté, from 2018-2020, instead relying on sedition and cyber crime laws. 

However, when the pro-democracy protests led by students and youth started calling for political reforms in July 2020 – one of which was reform of the monarchy – the government reinforced the law in November 2020.

Cosplaying as royal figures, putting stickers on royal portraits, making public polls about the impact of royal motorcade, commenting on Facebook posts, can all be considered a crime. 

To make things worse, in November 2021, Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that calls for reform of the monarchy and the abolition of the lèse-majesté law were an attempt to overthrow the democratic regime with the King as Head of State.

Since 2020, at least 215 individuals –  including 17 minors – in 234 cases, have been charged and/or prosecuted with the law. 

Jatuporn’s was the tenth case in which the court handed down a guilty verdict on the basis of Article 112 since 2020. 

Problems with the law 

Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, founded in 2014, has been providing pro bono legal aid to individuals prosecuted for their political expression. Our clients, comprising about 1,700 citizens during 2020-2021 alone, have been charged and/or prosecuted under numerous offences, such as royal defamation, sedition, and other ‘crimes.’ 

As for the lèse-majesté offence, our documentation and database of all 234 cases show that the court’s judgments establish dangerous precedents for the country’s freedom of speech and assembly amidst heavy calls from the people demanding historic political changes. So far, there were just three lèse-majesté cases where courts acquitted the defendants.

There are three main problems with the lèse-majesté law.

First, it allows anyone to file criminal complaints against each other, enabling it to become a political tool to further polarise the country. We not only see lèse-majesté complaints made by the police and authorities, but also by at least a hundred ultraconservative citizens against political dissidents. This results in a continuous flux of new charges and expedited prosecutions by the public prosecutors.

Of all the lèse-majesté cases submitted to the prosecutors by the police, there was not a single case in which the prosecutors did not issue an indictment.

Second, the law is subjected to dangerously vague interpretation by the police, public prosecutors, and judges. Even though the law clearly stipulates an offence only for those who “defame, insult, or threaten the king, the queen, the heir-apparent, or the regent,” speeches and acts that were conducted without such intention were still convicted of lèse-majesté.

Third, the punishment of the law is grossly disproportionate.

This is exemplified by comparing it with similar laws in other countries with a monarch as head of state. In Denmark, the punishment for defamation of the king is up to four months in prison, though the law has never been enforced. In the Netherlands, the penalties are up to five years in prison and/or fine. In the UK, the last defamation law was enforced in 1715. Japan, Norway, and Sweden do not have such laws to protect their  monarchs.

In any case, regardless of the intention of the speeches, no one should be criminalised and put in jail for their expression, online or offline.

Criminalised for speech

As the youth-led movement gained momentum, Jatuporn first participated in the protests in her native Buriram province in northeastern Thailand before joining the demonstrations in Bangkok. 

On 29 October 2020, a political protest organised in the form of a street fashion show, understandably referring to the fashion brand of Princess Sirivannavari Nariratana Rajakanya, aimed to send out a wider political message. The message questioned the public budget, which is allocated to the monarchy even as the country’s economic crisis worsened  by the coronavirus pandemic.

Jatuporn rented a traditional Thai dress and joined the show as a mere participant. However, the public prosecutor submitted an accusation to the court, stating that Jatuporn’s action constituted “offensive, harassing, insulting, defaming or threatening acts against the King and the Queen, resulting in King Rama X and the Queen being humiliated, insulted, hated, and disrespected.” But this claim was supported only by circumstantial evidence.

Such a fate is shared by many others, including  the 52-year-old Sombat Thongyoi. A former red shirt security guard, he was recently sentenced to 6 years in prison for posting the phrase “very brave, very good, thank you” on his Facebook account along with a few other posts. The phrase referred to the King’s speech during his public visit to the royalist audience in October 2020. Sombat has been in prison for five months and still remains in detention.

Two activists were arrested in early 2021, and charged with selling calendars with images of yellow rubber ducks with phrases resembling those often used by the royal family. They were later indicted by the public prosecutor in 2022 as their act was understood to be an insult to the King.

Many people charged with lèse-majesté face prolonged pre-trial detention, with bail requests repeatedly denied by the police and the courts, citing the “gravity of the crime” and flight risk. 

Those who were granted bail have to front as much as $7,934 (300,000 baht) for their temporary freedom. When released, they are forced to refrain from  conducting activities that “tarnish the reputation of the monarchy,” and many others.  Effectively, the bail conditions serve as a form of out-of-prison detention of critics and deprive the basic rights from the defendants.

In January 2021, the court handed down the record punishment to a former civil servant, Anchan Preelerd. She was sentenced to 87 years in prison on 29 counts of lèse-majesté over audio clips she uploaded and disseminated on social media platforms. Her sentence was reduced to 43 years and six months as she pleaded guilty. Anchan still remains imprisoned at the Central Women’s Correctional Institution in Bangkok.

Thai Lawyers for Human Rights emphasises that nobody should be criminalised for exercising their freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Royal defamation should be abolished or amended to be in line with international human rights standards. Criticisms of all public figures, including heads of State, must be allowed and encouraged under democratic principles, and Thai authorities should listen to the young people who are the future generation of the country. 

The more the Thai state uses royal defamation to suppress the people’s freedom of speech to maintain ‘reverence,’ the result will be the opposite. Respect and faith of one’s public institution must be earned from the people — not forced. 

Sulakshana Lamubol is a Program Manager at Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, an NGO founded in 2014 to provide pro-bono legal aid to those charged and/or prosecuted for their political expression. It also documents human rights violations related to civil and political rights nationwide.

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Countless women were gang raped and molested by soldiers as the world watched an endless stream of traumatised and severely injured people flee to the Bangladesh border to escape the carnage behind them. As they walked, thick smoke filled the sky as their villages in northern Rakhine State turned to ash. . 

Conservative estimates say at least 6,700 people were killed during the first month of the massacre. Of these, 730 were children under the age of five. 

Some 400 villages were razed, and then more than 700,000 people became refugees in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar, now the world’s largest and most densely populated refugee settlement. 

As Rohingya survivors mark the fifth anniversary of that dark moment, what they call Genocide Day, their situation remains desperate. 

Unbearable situation

The government of Bangladesh kept  borders open to allow refugees an escape and safety from the Myanmar troops. . But the situation was nonetheless precarious. 

Years later, Bangladesh still restricts access to proper education for Rohingya refugees. They’re also prohibited from taking up work, and lack freedom of movement.  

The sprawling camps are fenced off with barbed wire  and many refugees feel as if they are living in a kind of prison zone as they can’t leave. 

In many cases, traffickers have abandoned Rohingya at sea or on land routes throughout the region. Prostitution and the selling of children and girls for marriage is also widespread.

Large fires have repeatedly devastated the overcrowded camps, and the refugees fear for their security as criminal gangs are operating freely.

In desperation, many refugees have been forced to make impossible decisions. Some have been pushed into criminal activities like drug smuggling and petty crime. Others have fallen into the hands of human traffickers. 

‘Enough is enough’

Despite the challenges, Rohingya refugees are striving to improve the lives of their community members. Some are teachers who provide informal education to children and youth, a group that doesn’t receive adequate services from the humanitarian sector. 

Rohingya volunteers have organised blood donations to healthcare centres and field hospitals around the camps, while others offer humanitarian aid to victims of fires or landslides. 

These are creative people with a rich culture and deep history. Some have documented their lives using photography, film, poetry, paintings, and storytelling.

But since December 2021, the Government of Bangladesh has not only forbidden formal education, but also criminalised the private tutoring that refugees themselves have provided. 

“Enough is enough! We don’t want to see a lost generation,” one young leader said.  “For five years now we are denied education.” 

The refugees are concerned for the future of their community. And they warn that this denial of basic rights will leave youth in despair, with no opportunities to support themselves in the future, a reality that could lead to increased criminality and radicalisation.

Another refugee said he is concerned about increased corruption in Bangladesh, the exploitation of vulnerable refugees and the tendency to collectively accuse refugees of misconduct. 

But more than anything, Rohingya are calling for the international community to help them return to Myanmar and be granted citizenship rights.  

“We want to go home!” refugees chanted at a peaceful protest on World Refugee Day on 20 June. “Peace and democracy for Myanmar!

Prospects for repatriation

Since the Myanmar coup in February  2021, the situation in Myanmar has deteriorated dramatically. In staging the coup, the military declared war against its entire population and people all over the country have been resisting with all available means.  

The military is unable to control the country, particularly Rakhine state, the home of the Rohingya. This state is effectively governed by the Arakan Army, an armed group of the Rakhine Buddhist population who have long been fighting for autonomy for the area.  

Repatriation of the Rohingya is therefore contingent on the goodwill of the Arakan Army, just as much as the military junta. 

While the Myanmar military is facing legal charges in international courts for the 2017 massacre, the international political investments in the repatriation of the Rohingya have been disappointingly poor.

It’s partly due to other overshadowing international crises, like those in Ukraine and Afghanistan, and partly due to stalemates caused by the geopolitical power play between the United States and China.

An end to military rule in Myanmar is the only way forward. International pressure on the military is essential. 

The military generals must be punished for their war crimes, and geopolitical disputes must be set aside as China and the United States have common interests in a stable Myanmar under civilian rule. 

International actors must join forces with the people of Myanmar, including the Rohingya, to put an end to the misery caused by the Myanmar military. 

For now, the Rohingya refugees in the Bangladesh camps are stuck between a rock hard place.
Without education and opportunities to make a living, the Rohingya will have no hopes for the  future and instead become a burden to their host community. 

Bangladeshi authorities need to engage in a dialogue with Rohingya leaders about how refugees can contribute to Bangladeshi society while they wait for repatriation.

Regrettably, a solution for Myanmar and for Rohingya repatriation is likely to be lengthy and complicated. It’s therefore pivotal that Bangladesh allow the refugees to live dignified lives while they wait. 

Marte Nilsen is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo. She has a specialist focus on political and violent conflicts in Myanmar and Thailand and civil society movements and societal transformation in peacebuilding and democratisation

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Decades later, Giay’s unease continues as ethnic tensions have reached a boiling point in his hometown, Jayapura.  

“On one hand, we have the Indonesian government that rarely listens to the indigenous Papuans,” Giay said. “On the other, we have problems arising from repressive acts by security forces against our people and the continuing inflow of Indonesian migrants. All of these are sources of conflict.”

Many view Papua as Indonesia’s most restive region as conflict between indigenous Papuans and Indonesian security forces has worsened. 

Indigenous Papuan leaders have said they fear violence could be on the horizon and new research suggests those concerns could soon come true. 

Mounting tensions between indigenous Papuans and Indonesian state security forces could result in increased violence and even “mass atrocities” over the next year and a half, according to a July report by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide.

Our political elite in Jakarta have kept indigenous Papuans out of political decision making concerning their own land”

Made Supriatma, research fellow, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

The report spotlights the challenges Indonesia faces in responding to growing secessionist sentiments among indigenous Papuans. 

Papua, Indonesia’s easternmost province, makes up the western half of New Guinea and other islands. Home to 4.3 million inhabitants, 2.3 million of whom are indigenous Papuans, the province has seen heightened mass protests and armed resistance since 2019. 

The conflict has stemmed primarily from groups collectively known to Indonesians Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), and as the Papuan Independence Organisation. 

“Papua is Indonesia’s own time bomb, ready to go off at any moment,” said Made Supriatma, a research fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute who authored the Holocaust museum report. 

The researcher identified two worst-case scenarios in which mass violence could occur. Pro-Indonesia militias, aided by military and police, could target pro-independence Papuans, while Indonesian migrants together with Indonesian security forces could commit “atrocities” against indigenous Papuans, Supriatma said.

“Papua’s volatility today owes much to the history of its integration with Indonesia and the way our political elite in Jakarta have kept indigenous Papuans out of political decision making concerning their own land,” Supriatma explained. 

Papua, which is divided into the provinces of Papua and Papua Barat, has a complex history.

Papua was not part of the new republic when Indonesia declared independence in 1945. The area remained under Dutch rule until 1962, when a U.S.-sponsored agreement transferred sovereignty to Indonesia. 

Shortly after the agreement, Papua entered UN trusteeship until a 1969 referendum, the “Act of Free Choice, also known as PEPERA. The majority voted in favour of “integration,” sparking widespread frustration and anger among indigenous Papuans. 

Like Giay, many Papuans at the time perceived the Act of Free Choice Law as far from democratic.

“It wasn’t a one-man-one-vote referendum in 1969,” Giay said. “The Indonesian government chose 1,025 tribal chiefs in our stead, who, under intimidation, voted for integration. How could it have been the will of the people?”

Second-class citizens

The immediate problem is the extension of the Special Autonomy Law, Giay said.

The Indonesian government granted Papua a 20-year Special Autonomy Status in 2001 to stem secessionist sentiments. But the law also divided the region into two provinces, causing further dissatisfaction among Papuans who believed they had not been consulted by the government.

Alongside the extension, the government plans to redraw the borders of the existing three provinces, Papua Selatan, Papua Tengah and Papua Pegunungan. A timeline for the change has not been determined.

“More provinces isn’t what Papuans need at the moment,” Giay said. “We have more pressing issues.”

Without consulting indigenous Papuan groups, the Indonesian government extended the Special Autonomy Law for 20 years in 2021, claiming further decentralisation would speed the region’s development. But the move has distressed indigenous Papuans further, Giay noted.

“The new provinces were in cahoots with very few indigenous elite Papuans, mostly government officials, but the majority of us are opposing it,” Giay said, noting that lack of consultation breeds division and many Papuans think they are viewed as “second-class citizens.” 

Giay worries that splitting up Papua into more provinces will also lead to an increase in security personnel in the region. He recounted reports in which the largely non-Papuan Indonesian forces stationed in the region mistreated indigenous Papuans.

Papua has the highest number of security forces in Indonesia, with around 37,000 military or police officers stationed in the region since 2013. The state deployed one law enforcement officer for every 97 inhabitants, while the rest of Indonesia’s provinces see a ratio of one per 296 inhabitants.

Giay said he also worried corruption will rise as bureaucracy expands, but his greatest concern is the heightened risk of clashes between the military and pro-independence militias.

Indonesian military operations against pro-independence groups in areas including Nduga, Intan Jaya, Puncak Papua and others, displaced around 67,000 indigenous Papuans who fled their villages as fighting broke out in recent years, according to Giay. 

“Fragmentation among indigenous Papuans will get worse when the new provinces are created because the new regions are demarcated along ethnic lines,” he said. “Economically, it can only lead to greater competition between indigenous people for access to the autonomy funds.”

Encouraging divisions

Academics who have studied Papua’s instability also view the new plans for the region as problematic.

Hipolitus Ringgi Wangge, a researcher at Australia National University, Canberra, questioned the political motive behind creating more provinces in Papua.

“Its goal isn’t devolution,” he  said. “They want to encourage further divisions among indigenous Papuans who make up at least 261 ethnic groups. The aim is to weaken separatist aspirations.” 

The plan is highly unpopular among indigenous Papuans. Over the past two years, protesters have met repression and violence from security forces including a 2021 fatal shooting of two civilians by security forces during a protest in Yahukimo, Papua Pegunungan, Wanggee said..

“The creation of new provinces will also be a magnet for more non-Papuan economic migrants to come pouring in, which will also stoke up tensions between indigenous Papuans and the Indonesian migrants,” Wangge said.

Papuans are ethnic Melanesians, like the inhabitants of the Maluku and Nusa Tenggara regions in Indonesia, neighbouring Papua New Guinea and Oceanic countries including Vanuatu and Fiji. 

But the Papuan economy is now dominated by Indonesian migrants, with indigenous Papuans increasingly sidelined and left behind. This has fuelled enmity between the groups, Supriatma said. 

“Indigenous Papuans living outside Papua are often ridiculed because of their skin colour, curly hair and diets,” he added. 

Police shouted at Papuan students living in Java when they refused to raise the Indonesian flag to commemorate the country’s independence day in 2019. The incident triggered anti-racism protests in cities across Indonesia, including Papua. 

Although the unrest may seem inevitable to some observers, Supriatma said he believes there are actionable courses that could minimise the violence.

The Indonesian government should do more to improve freedom of information in Papua by lifting entrance restrictions for journalists and researchers. This could allow indigenous populations to address local grievances and build trust, said Supriatma, who also hopes the government will remove the heavy security presence and consult with indigenous locals in its decision-making process concerning Papua. 

A nonviolent approach to protests is also essential. Indonesian security forces dissolving pro-integration militias immediately is critical to peace, he said.  

In Jayapura, Giay prayed for peace and said he hopes his people will be spared more suffering, even as potential violence simmers. 

When dealing with Papua, the government should remember the second point of Pancasila, Indonesia’s state ideology, to act civilised and just, Giay said. 

“True humanity can go a long way here,” he said.

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In the United States, the Supreme Court’s 24 June decision to overturn Roe v. Wade, the court’s 1973 ruling ensuring abortion rights, toppled nearly 50 years of U.S. legal precedent by granting power to individual states to make their own abortion laws. The change dismantled the national protection of abortion as a choice in cases of medical emergencies or unwanted pregnancies.

The court’s ruling was shocking to some in the moment of announcement, but also unsurprising to those who have watched the court’s rightward shift, which was cemented with the addition of three conservative justices appointed by former President Donald Trump and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. The nine Supreme Court justices hold lifetime appointments and Trump was able to add Neil Gorsuch (2017), Brett Kavanaugh (2018) and Amy Coney Barrett (2020) following the deaths of Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the retirement of Anthony Kennedy. The new lineup gave the court’s conservative wing enough votes to discard the abortion precedent.

The decision exemplifies how issues of morality and politics have overtaken pure medical science and placed abortion at the centre of a furious ethical dispute that has fueled heated debate and, at times, extreme violence in the U.S. and beyond. Personal standards of morality, often based on religious tenets, drive the public battle over the issue. 

Subsequently, the responsibility for establishing medical guidelines for abortion procedures – the number of elapsed weeks or the circumstances leading to the pregnancy of a person seeking termination – has been taken up by lawmakers and governments. The ensuing statutes regulating abortion vary greatly by country, including those in Southeast Asia.

The World Health Organization (WHO) released an updated version of its Abortion Care Guideline in March. In an executive summary, the authors noted “6 out of 10 unintended pregnancies and 3 out of 10 of all pregnancies ending in induced abortion,” but 45% of abortions are considered “unsafe.” Of those categorised as unsafe, 97% are in developing countries “among groups in vulnerable and marginalized situations.” Between 4.7% and 13.2% of annual maternal deaths, 13,865 to 38,940 deaths, are the result of unsafe abortions.

“Legal restrictions and other barriers mean many women find it difficult or impossible to access quality abortion care and they may induce abortion themselves using unsafe methods or seek abortion from unskilled providers,” the WHO stated. “The legal status of abortion makes no difference to a woman’s need for an abortion, but it dramatically affects her access to safe abortion.”

Southeast Asia Globe compiled a list of current abortion laws and policies in each of the region’s nations using information from sources including the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR), a global legal and human rights organisation, and the Global Abortion Policies Database (GAPD) operated by the WHO’s Human Reproduction Programme. 

Brunei

Abortion is illegal in Brunei and punishable by public flogging under Shariah law introduced by the government in 2014, when Brunei became the first Southeast Asian country to introduce a national Sharia penal code through a three-phase implementation process finalised in April 2019.

Jail sentences of up to 10 years also can be handed down for terminating pregnancies. There are certain exceptions made for abortions performed “in good faith to save the life of the woman,” according to a summary posted by pro-choice NGO Women on Waves.

Cambodia

Abortions are legally available in Cambodia, although in relevant cases parental notification and authorisation is required, CRR reported.

In some countries, there is ‘gestational limit’ for abortions, meaning the time frame within a pregnancy during which an abortion may be conducted. The CRR legal database calculates gestational limits “from the first day of the last menstrual period, which is considered to occur two weeks prior to conception. Where laws specify that gestational age limits are calculated from the date of conception, these limits have been extended by two weeks.”

The gestational limit in Cambodia is 14 weeks, according to CRR.

Indonesia

Indonesian law allows abortion in medical emergencies, as well as in cases of severe foetal anomaly. 

The law was expanded in 2009 to legalise abortion in cases of rape, but only within six weeks of gestation. The abortion must be approved by experts, have the consent of the pregnant woman or her husband or family and be performed by health workers, according to the Women on Waves Indonesia report. 

Indonesian abortion law is based on a national health law passed in 1992, which is in itself modelled on the colonial Dutch criminal code of 1918. The penalty for illegal abortions is up to four years in jail, Amnesty International reported

A teenage girl was sentenced to six months in jail in 2018 for terminating a pregnancy after being raped by her brother. She was later cleared and released. 

Laos

Abortion is “prohibited altogether” in Laos, according to CRR.

The GAPD report on Laos noted rape is considered a legal ground for abortion with a gestational limit of 28 weeks. 

Legal penalties for performing abortions include imprisonment from two to five years, while a person performing their own abortion or commissioning an abortion can face three months to three years in prison, Women on Waves reported.

Malaysia

Abortion is technically legal in Malaysia, though there are immense restrictions attached. Section 312 of the 2018 Malaysian Penal Code states termination is only allowed when a registered medical practitioner deems the pregnancy is a risk to the woman’s life or may cause physical or mental health injury. Public health professionals can deem abortions inappropriate according to their personal or religious views.

In a public hospital setting, standard operating procedures requires two doctors, including a specialist, to be present during pre-abortion assessments. 

The legal permissions for abortion due to possible health risks have a gestational limit of 22 weeks, according to Malaysia’s GAPD report.

Myanmar

Abortion is allowed only “to save the woman’s life,” CRR reported.

There are no legal grounds or exemptions for abortions and penalties can be brought against a pregnant person, abortion providers and assistants, according to the GAPD Myanmar report.

The Philippines

Abortion is prohibited in the Philippines. Article 12, Section 12 of the Philippines Constitution cites the state’s recognition of “the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.”

Legal penalties listed in the country’s Revised Penal Code of 1930 include potential prison sentences and fines for pregnant women, family members, physicians, pharmacists and midwives.

The government informed the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2019 that abortion may be legally justified “to protect the life and health” of a pregnant person, according to CRR’s Jihan Jacob.

In a March opinion article for Filpino news outlet Rappler, Jacob said an online petition calling for repeal of the code’s abortion provisions has received almost 30,000 signatures, while advocates have “launched a draft bill repealing the penal provisions and providing for a positive legal framework to ensure abortion access.”

Singapore

Singapore was one of the first countries in Asia to legalise abortion in 1969. Abortion is available to all Singapore citizens and those with ‘permanent resident’ status and student or work visas. ‘Foreigners’ who do not meet those criteria are eligible for abortions if they have resided in Singapore for more than four months or are considered a permanent resident, are married to a citizen or hold a work permit pass. 

There is no minimum age requirement and minors under the age of 16 do not need parental consent. Abortion is prohibited after 24 weeks unless the mother’s life is in danger, according to Singapore-based women’s helpline AWARE.

Thailand

Abortions are legally available in Thailand and the gestational limit is 12 weeks, CRR reported.

Out of Thailand’s 1.34 million annual pregnancies between 2015 and 2019, 51% were unintended and 64% of the unintended pregnancies ended in abortion, according to the Guttmacher Institute, a U.S.-based research and policy organisation supporting sexual and reproductive health rights

Timor-Leste

Abortion is legally allowed only to save a pregnant person’s life in Timor-Leste, according to CRR, which noted parental notification and authorisation is required in relevant cases.

Legal grounds for abortion include foetal impairment and risks to mental and physical health. Those who can face penalties for breaking the law include the pregnant person, the abortion provider and those assisting, according to GAPD’s Timor-Leste report.

There were 54,900 pregnancies annually between 2015 and 2019 in Timor-Leste, including 27% that were unintended. Of the unintended pregnances, 68% were terminated by abortion, the Guttmacher Institute reported.

Vietnam

Abortions are legally available in Vietnam, CRR reported.

Vietnam’s Law on the Protection of Public Health, Chapter VII, Article 44, states medical institutions and individuals may not perform abortions without permission from the Ministry of Public Health, according to an unofficial translation on CRR’s website. 

The penal code outlaws illegal abortions, with offenders facing prison terms of one to five years and non-custodial sentences up to three years. Cases involving loss of life or serious health damage to the patient face prison sentences from three to 15 years along with possible fines and bans from certain positions and jobs.

Additional reporting by Amanda Oon.

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“We can leave no one behind, so when we are trying to include everyone, institutions have a key role to play,” explained Sophany San, CGIS director. “Policy makers need to see what are their peoples’ needs, what are the challenges, what kinds of mechanisms are needed to include them so they can benefit and contribute to society.”

Illuminating the landscape for authorities, CGIS research looks at all levels of governance. Building on ethnographic work conducted in 2007, 2020’s Local Leadership in Cambodia provided a historical perspective on past trends in commune governance, how attitudes have changed in the last 12 years and was designed to provide stakeholders with context-specific data on how to improve democratic participation at the local level. There are signs of progress.

“At the community level, authorities organise public forums, so that men and women, old and young, can discuss the needs of the community and what the people need,” said CGIS Research Associate, Theavy Chhom. “Then the villages decide what is the priority so they can use the budget to address these issues.”

However, in Cambodia, accountable institutions and inclusive society building goes beyond the public sector. 

Given the historically oversized role that non-governmental organisations have played in the country, it makes sense that civil society organisations and community-based organisations would feature in CGIS research. Citing “capacity gaps, limited civic space and a polarising political discourse” as obstacles to inclusive society building, the 2020 study Building Capacities for Civic Engagement, Peacebuilding and Inclusive Dialogue: Towards Inclusive and Participatory Governance aimed to promote democratic governance and expand opportunities through peaceful discourse.  

From commune governance to public private partnerships (PPP), the core theme running through all CGIS research is the lived experiences of Cambodian people. With the impacts of Covid-19 permeating nearly every aspect of daily life, it has also become an area of focus for the group’s work. 

Wrapping up the first phase in January 2022, Social Protection and the Gendered Impacts of Covid-19 in Cambodia: Longitudinal Research to “Build Back Better” in the Global Garment Industry documented the pandemic experiences of 200 women garment workers. Examining the coping strategies of these women and formal and informal social protection mechanisms, the findings shined a light on problems with contemporary development models and the well-worn theme of worker exploitation within the global capitalist paradigm. 

The expansion of the social safety net through programs like the National Social Protection Policy Framework are a step towards realising an inclusive society in Cambodia, however, more work remains. 

“I want to see everybody, no matter who they are — rural or urban, old or young, men or women, and LGBT — included,” said San. “There has been a lot of progress and if you look at the legislation, it is good. The policy commitment for equality is much appreciated but the implementation is still a challenge.”

This article is a part of a paid partnership with Cambodia Development Resource Institute celebrating their 30 Year Anniversary and highlighting their work over the past three decades . Follow CDRI and stay up to date with their projects on their Facebook page. Learn more about the partnership here.

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Thailand has cultivated a useful mass of soft power –  the ability to exert influence through attraction or persuasion instead of coercion –  through its local traditions, culture and reputation for hospitality. However, according to the 2022 Global Soft Power Index, measured by seven supporting pillars including trade, governance, international relations, culture, media, communications, education, and values, the Kingdom dropped to 35th of out 120 countries surveyed, a fall of two places from 2021. 

One aspect of the Index’s methodology is governance, where leadership, political stability, low levels of corruption and respect for human rights and the rule of law are key indicators. Here, Thailand performs terribly. The country’s cultivation of soft power is contrasted with other less desirable characteristics, which undermine its ability to utilise and maximise soft power gains. 

The power of Thailand’s military-backed government to swoop in and crack down on any perceived threat has repressed a fertile environment for music and creativity to flourish. For every Milli that makes their way to Coachella, there are artists such as Rap Against Dictatorship, a group which caught the government’s attention when one of its songs,  ‘prathet ku mi’  (“My country has”) reached 20 million views after just a few weeks. Their song “Reform” was later banned from viewing on YouTube by the Thai government after a legal complaint. 

Dechathorn, from the same rap group, was recently warned by Apple that his smartphones could be targeted by state-sponsored hackers. At the centre of the scandal was Israeli spyware maker NSO Group, whose Pegasus software enabled itto target iPhones. 

Creativity, an essential ingredient in this variety of soft power, requires an enabling environment. Thailand’s repressive government makes individual successes like Milli’s feel like more of an anomaly than a normal occurrence. 

A leader like Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who mocks the free press, and threatens protesters with “all laws and all articles” including lèse majesté, an offence covering insult to the monarch or monarchy, is not one who can effectively elevate Thailand’s soft power. The Kingdom’s indifference to human rights is fast becoming common knowledge worldwide, in a situation similar to China’s where vast cultural soft power is considerably diminished by headline-dominating stories of state repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, an authoritarian crackdown in Hong Kong and the lingering threat of an invasion of Taiwan.

Thailand has to coordinate its soft power approaches. Attitudes, consumer behaviour, and social norms are far more complicated matters than hard power strategies. Hard power is the ability to persuade others by coercion, through either economic, political or military means. Soft power is a more nuanced process than  calculating a cost-benefit analysis, devising a strategy, then a matter of implementation. People are complex and react to messaging differently. And, as shown by China, hard power approaches and soft power implementation often collide. 

Tokyo was previously associated with imperialism and occupation, as well as a business culture that was regarded as exploitative. The National Student Centre of Thailand called Japan the “only country in the world which is labelled by almost every other country as an economic animal which loves to invade the economies of other countries” in 1972.  Despite political turmoil in Thailand, Japan spent decades restoring its image through soft power means, and now continues to enjoy repeat visitors from the Kingdom. 

In contrast, Thailand’s soft power gains are tempered by decades of political instability and a less than stellar international reputation. 

Thailand should regard soft power as a long-term strategy rather than a piecemeal approach based on current trends and fads. It is unlikely that Milli’s mango sticky rice temptation will bolster Thai soft power in the near term. Government plans have been sparse or detached. As creative industries are a growing part of Thailand’s economic development, the government established the Creative Economy Agency (CEA) in 2012. However, while stimulating more than 15 sectors of the economy including fashion, the CEA has yet to tie any of them to a cohesive national soft power strategy on par with that of South Korea, or India. 

Thailand’s soft power reach need not be global. An established Thai soft power persona could establish Bangkok as a creative regional hub for television and streaming content, art, music, theatre and more. However, Thailand has yet to learn that creative freedom must also come with intellectual and political freedoms. Prayut has used soft power opportunities to promote Thai nationalism, which can be as corrosive as it can be historically intriguing. His recent promotion of the Rattanakosin Era is also controversial as it also glorifies a period of absolute monarchy. The period was also punctuated by wars with the Burmese and Lao kingdoms, a favourite topic among Thai right-wing nationalists. 

For Thai soft power to coalesce into something greater, it requires patience, time, and a coordinated approach, driven by individuals and private enterprise, and supported by government resources. It’s unclear whether Prayut and the current government have the temperament to nurture soft power without undermining it for political reasons or hard power pursuits. In the meantime, shops experiencing an uptick in mango sticky rice sales should count their blessings while they last.

Mark S. Cogan is an associate professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Kansai Gaidai University in Osaka, Japan. He is a former communications specialist with the United Nations in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

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“This could be a start of something worse, not only for Europe but for Asia,” said Long, the Taiwan-based co-director of Legal Initiatives for Vietnam, a nonprofit promoting democracy.

“This has everything to do with Vietnam as a small country living next to a giant power,” Long said of Vietnam’s 1,297-kilometre (806-mile) border with China. “We are very vulnerable. We need to rely on a rules-based international order.”

But Vietnam has a distinct allyship with Russia and has not issued an outright condemnation of the invasion. The Soviet Union backed northern Vietnam during its decades-long war with the U.S. and the aid continued after 1975.

Now, Russia has inherited these ties and Vietnam is its closest ally in the region. Vietnam buys the majority of its weapons from Russia and has given Russia its highest diplomatic status. Vietnam’s careful manoeuvring around Russia’s invasion is likely based on a shared history that has tightly bonded the two countries through today.

Nguyen Khac Giang, a Ph.D. candidate at the Victoria University of Wellington focusing on Vietnam and Asian affairs, noted Vietnam and Russia share a “unique and intimate relationship.” 

The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognise Vietnam as a sovereign nation after it declared independence from France in 1945. During the ‘American War,’ as it is known in Vietnam, the Soviet Union supported communist forces. The Soviets provided North Vietnam with funding, equipment and advisors to assist their fight against encroaching global ‘imperialism,’ most visibly represented by the United States during the Second Indochina War, which stretched across Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia between 1955 and 1975. 

In 1979, the Soviet Union sent arms, military equipment and advisors to the Vietnam-China border during an invasion by Chinese forces. That support likely deterred a much larger-scale invasion, Giang said.  

“Russia inherited the position from the Soviet Union so all the love, all the gratitude, the friendship and the brotherhood that the Vietnamese have for the Soviet Union, they naturally [kept] this kind of sentiment toward Russia,” he said. 

This affection is reflected in the Vietnamese government granting Russia its highest diplomatic status level, a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” said Giang, who recalled a 2017 survey that found Putin enjoyed an 89% approval rating in Vietnam at the time, higher than in Russia.

“Since Vladimir Putin came into power in 2000 there has been a sense in Vietnam, like quite a popular sentiment in Vietnam, that Putin actually has brought back the greatness of the Soviet Union,” he said. 

The United Nations General Assembly gathered in New York City on 2 March to vote on a resolution condemning Moscow for invading Ukraine and demanding withdrawal of military forces. The room erupted in applause when two large screens showed the majority of nations voted for the resolution.

While 141 countries voted in favour and five countries opposed the resolution, Vietnam was one of 35 nations to abstain from voting.

In an address to the UN before the resolution vote, Vietnam’s Permanent UN Representative Dang Hoang Giang called for a resumption of dialogue and negotiation “with a view to achieving long-term solutions that take into consideration the interests and concerns of all parties, in accordance with international law, in particular the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.”

Giang of Victoria University said the ambassador’s statement was “quite extraordinary because it implicitly criticises the invasion of Russia on Ukraine.”  

The statement pointed to Vietnam’s own suffering from invasions and war and claimed that Ukraine’s interests should be respected in line with the UN charter’s national sovereignty doctrine, Giang said.

“In a way, it’s a veiled criticism against Russia and I think that probably is the farthest that Vietnam can go because of the special relationship that it has with Russia,” he added.

Ha Hoang Hop, a visiting senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies-Yusof Ishak Institute, a political and economic research centre in Singapore, said Dang Hoang Giang “skirted around the issue of Russia’s aggression” by abstaining from the UN resolution vote.

“Abstaining means indecision, and Vietnam will have to look more at Beijing’s actions in [the] South China Sea,” he said. “If a foreign country invades Vietnam, Vietnam will not expect the international community to abstain to any similar UN resolution against war and invasion.”

Long said his country’s UN action did not accurately reflect the will of citizens, noting that Dang Hoang Giang essentially “agreed that this was unlawful but they voted otherwise.”

“I think that the majority of Vietnamese people voted with the 141 countries that voted yes for the resolution,” Long said. “The Vietnamese government does not represent the Vietnamese people’s public opinion on this Ukraine issue. It is so clear that it is a grave violation of international law.”

Long said Vietnam’s citizens should expect more from their representation on the international stage: “This is irresponsible. We are on the wrong side of history on this issue.”

He added that a delegation of Vietnamese civil society organisations met with the Ukrainian ambassador at its embassy in Vietnam with a letter of support from more than 200 organisations and individuals.

“[The Vietnamese population] is divided but I believe that the majority is on Ukraine’s side, not Russia’s,” Long said.

Vietnam’s economy, energy sector, defence capabilities and the future of activism could all be impacted by Russia’s military campaign.

Long noted Vietnam’s media outlets are not allowed to use the word ‘invasion’ in reference to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and critical statements in local news sources are suppressed. 

Most of the Vietnam army’s military equipment is purchased from Russia, which could be halted as a result of sanctions by Western nations, Giang said, although the country has been able to purchase military items from Israel and the U.S. since 2015. 

A 2019 study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found Vietnam imported 84% of its total arms from Russia between 1995 and 2019. The submarines, tanks, fighter jets and assorted weaponry totaled $7.4 billion during the time period. 

Sanctions also could impact Vietnam with a disruption in remittances for Russian transactions, problems for Vietnamese nationals living in Russia and lost tourism revenue.

“Phan Thiet is called ‘Little Moscow,’ so when there are no Russians around it will be a big blow for local tourist operators,” Giang said.

Hop concurred that sanctions against Russia could hurt its Southeast Asia ally and business partner.

“Sanctions to Russia have been affecting Vietnam negatively from 2014. New Western sanctions will further impact Vietnam,” he said, adding that Russia’s supply of weapons and military equipment maintenance to Vietnam has provided conventional deterrence to an invasion.

Lucas Myers, a coordinator and Southeast Asia associate at the Wilson Center, a nonpartisan policy institute in Washington, D.C., said Vietnam is in “the most complicated position” resulting from its close defence relationship and energy sector involvement with Russia amidst growing diplomatic ties to the U.S.

“Vietnam is Russia’s closest partner in Southeast Asia, and Russian energy investments and arms sales make this situation complicated for Hanoi,” Myers said.

Russian arms sales to Vietnam could run afoul of U.S. legislation placing sanctions on perceived U.S. adversaries, including Russia, North Korea and Iran. The energy sector could also face future Western sanctions, Myers said, with targets including Zarubezhneft, a Russian state-controlled oil company drilling in the South China Sea.

“In the long-term, Vietnam could find itself under increasing pressure to purchase arms from Western partners and find alternative investors in its energy sector,” Myers said. “However, considering the large risks of attracting Chinese anger as a result of investments in the South China Sea energy market, it will be difficult to find partners with as much risk tolerance as Russian energy firms.”

Giang agreed that Vietnam’s response to the Ukraine invasion is influenced by its location within China’s regional sphere of influence, which he added is the case for most of the smaller nations of Southeast Asia.

This is not about choosing sides between Russia or Ukraine. You are choosing principles.”

Nguyen Khac Giang, Ph.D. candidate, Victoria University of Wellington

“Similar to Ukraine, Vietnam is a small country that stays next to a very powerful military power, that is China,” Giang said. “Vietnam is always very concerned about the aggression from China. And Vietnam probably believes that if they don’t speak out this time, and then maybe something happens in the future, no one will speak for Vietnam if something similar happened. It’s a matter of principle.”

He added that the Ukraine crisis means less attention will be paid in the near future to developments in Asia: “It will be a tough time ahead for countries in the region in terms of dealing with the rise of China.”

Long said Vietnam “cannot survive in a might-equals-right international order.”

“I just hope that a small country like Vietnam would be more supportive of a rules-based international order,” he said. “This is not about choosing sides between Russia or Ukraine. You are choosing principles.”

Vietnam isn’t the only Southeast Asian country looking to hedge Chinese influence through connections to Russia.

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic has good Chinese relations but also is “overwhelmingly economically dependent upon China.” Somewhat like Vietnam, Laos may possibly view Russia as “a hedge against dependence” on China, Myers said.

“Unlike Vietnam, however, Lao PDR does not have close relations with the United States and will likely have few alternate options to its defence ties to Russia,” he said. “Over the long-term, Lao PDR will likely continue to expand its ties to Russia.”

Zachary Abuza, a Southeast Asia expert at the National War College in Washington, D.C., said Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar will see an impact on their military supplies from Russia. Vietnam and Laos are in a “particular bind” after remaining long-time Russian clients. 

“They abstained from the UN vote and both militaries are dependent on Russia for arms,” Abuza said, “but they really need to consider Putin’s justifications for war and the fact that the Chinese have endorsed Russia’s actions. Caveat emptor.”

Additional reporting by Brian P. D. Hannon.

This article was updated 17 March 2022 to explain the Soviet Union sent arms, military equipment and advisors to the Vietnam-China border in 1979.

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The invasion has created more than 3 million refugees and driven another 1.5 million ‘internally displaced’ people from their homes, according to the United Nations. The tools of war have tragically ended an unknown number of lives, including civilians and soldiers shrouded in plastic and carpets and lowered into mass graves in the port city of Mariupol.

Although the brutality of Russia’s invasion so far remains confined to Ukrainian territory, the instigator’s deep political and business ties have caused ripples far beyond the front lines.

Conversations with Southeast Asia experts revealed the myriad ways the conflict in Eastern Europe has already touched ASEAN countries, with additional reverberations set to follow.

Official responses from Southeast Asian governments have been mixed. In the first 36 hours following the invasion, Singapore and Indonesia condemned Russia’s attack, Malaysia expressed ‘sadness’ and Thailand was trying to repatriate its citizens, the South China Morning Post reported. The Philippines denounced the invasion in a 28 February statement, news outlet Rappler reported.

The UN General Assembly issued a resolution on 2 March calling on Russia to end the Ukraine offensive and withdraw its forces. A vote on the measure included 141 nations in favour, five opposed and 35 member states abstaining, including China, Laos and Vietnam.

Impact on ASEAN

The short-term consequences for Southeast Asia are debatable.

Thomas Daniel, a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) in Malaysia, called the ASEAN response “mixed and generally restrained.” Diplomatic relations with Russia are expected to continue, though perhaps at a slower pace and with the possibility of attempts to politically isolate the invading nation if civilian casualties or other violations become impossible to ignore.

Yet ASEAN action is a consensus of all 10 members, meaning “decisions are often the lowest common denominator,” he said.

Lucas Myers, a programme coordinator and Southeast Asia associate at the Wilson Center, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C., also observed a “somewhat muted” ASEAN response, likely resulting from concerns over alienating Russia.

“Only the Myanmar junta gave a full-throated endorsement of Russia’s position, and Vietnam and Laos’ abstentions in the UN General Assembly vote were not as strong a statement of support as a ‘no’ vote would have been,” Myers said, adding that sanctions against Russia carry the risk of impacting energy investments and arms sales to Southeast Asia.

“This will make it harder to acquire Russian arms for countries like Vietnam and incentivise looking elsewhere for new weapon procurements,” Myers said. “However, any transition away from Russian arms would take many years and be very difficult for regional militaries.”

Gilang Kembara, a researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, said Indonesia appears to be among the nations reluctant to strain their Russian relationship.

“Domestic opinion indicates that any support given towards Ukraine would indicate Indonesia’s willingness to ‘follow the Western narrative,’ or to be ‘pro-West.’ Such [a] position has so far been quite unpopular with the public, which has led to an increasing support of Russia, predominantly in social media,” Kembara said.

He added that there continue to be attempts by Ukraine and Russia to present their sides to civil society organisations and news outlets in Indonesia: “It would appear that the battle to gain public support in Southeast Asia is still ongoing.”

Dr. Zachary Abuza, a professor of national security strategy and a Southeast Asia expert at the National War College in Washington, D.C., said most ASEAN nations do not appear “willing to punish Russia for their illegal war of aggression,” but the length of the war and the “degree of devastation” against civilian populations will likely factor into future diplomatic relations.

Russia has “zero soft power” among ASEAN countries. “Southeast Asia has never been a priority region for Russia, beyond arms sales. It has been opportunistic, taking advantage of coups in Thailand, Myanmar and the rise of Duterte [in the Philippines], but there’s been little follow through,” Abuza said.

Still, the smaller nations of Southeast Asia are not expected to take a firm stand as a diplomatic bloc, he said.

“The two ASEAN statements [on 26 February and 3 March] have been so meaningless, refusing to name Russia, call it an aggressor or to use the word invasion,” Abuza said. “Most governments in Southeast Asia want to be neutral. This is dangerously naive. You are either on the side of international law or you are on the side of a revanchist power that has rejected a nation’s sovereignty and right to exist.”

Dr. Chin Kok Fay, a political economist at the National University of Malaysia, said Malaysia has taken a diplomatic “cautious approach” in line with a hedging strategy to avoid undermining its national interests.

Most governments in Southeast Asia want to be neutral. This is dangerously naive.”

Dr. Zachary Abuza, professor of national security strategy and Southeast Asia expert at the National War College, Washington, D.C.

Dr. Marek Rutkowski, a global studies lecturer at Monash University Malaysia, said Malaysia’s response has been “underwhelming,” in part because it is another Russian arms customer but also due to a realpolitik strategy leading the country to vote for the UN resolution while opposing unilateral sanctions. 

“There is probably not much more that can be expected given that the conflict is far removed from the Malaysian borders and a restrained response seems like a pragmatic choice,” he said, noting that the invasion goes against ASEAN’s core philosophy.

“ASEAN has always upheld the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs of states and adherence to international law,” Rutkowski said. 

“These principles, essential to the wellbeing and survival of Southeast Asian nations, have been grossly violated by Russia in Ukraine,” he said. “Given that the presence of a large and powerful neighbour, China, looms over ASEAN, it is possible to see potential dangers if Russia’s aggression goes unchecked.”

China’s shadow

Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hua Chunying cast blame for the invasion on the U.S. and NATO: “Those who follow the U.S. lead in fanning up flames and then shifting the blame onto others are truly irresponsible,” she said on 24 February, a day after pointing the finger at NATO expansion “all the way to Russia’s doorstep.”

Foreign Minister Wang Yi said during a 7 March news conference that his nation “will maintain our strategic focus and promote the development of a comprehensive China-Russia partnership in the new era.”

Daniel of ISIS Malaysia said China’s supportive stance on Russia’s invasion likely has influenced governments in Southeast Asia, “especially for countries that are part of, or have interest in, the South China Sea dispute.”

“Some of Russia’s narratives of Ukraine and its history are worryingly similar to Beijing’s justifications for its claims on the South China Sea,” Daniel said. “China’s implicit and explicit support, or countenance, of Russia’s action should be of concern to Southeast Asia.”

Abuza said China’s position “should set off alarm bells across Southeast Asia.”

“China continues to blame the United States and NATO for the war, not the unilateral decision of Russia to invade a sovereign country with 190,000 troops,” he said. “China has signed off on Russia’s ‘legitimate security concerns’ and its doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty.’ I know China always says sovereignty is at the core of its foreign policy, but their actions should speak loudly.”

Myers said the alignment between the larger nations against the U.S. could indicate to ASEAN nations that Russia cannot be relied upon to challenge China in a regional crisis, such as a South China Sea dispute. ASEAN subsequently may look for other political partners while trying to maintain long-term ties to Russia.

Most ASEAN countries joined the UN resolution, likely due to concern over the ramifications for smaller nations of China’s growing power, Myers noted.

“Over the long term, many in Southeast Asia do not want to abandon their burgeoning ties with Russia because Moscow is viewed as an important partner for avoiding dependence on China,” he said, adding that Cambodia’s vote for the resolution demonstrated autonomy from China despite the larger nation’s substantial influence.

“It appears that many in Southeast Asia still wish to maintain relations with Russia over the long-term despite its unreliability, and only Singapore is willing to join the sanctions regime at this time,” Myers said.

Only Singapore has been willing to join the sanctions regime and do something about it.”

Sophal Ear, associate dean, Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management

Chin said Southeast Asian nations are “deeply concerned” over Ukraine, but there are few short-term implications in the region except possibly for Singapore, which he said has been added to Russia’s list of ‘unfriendly foreign states.’”

Sophal Ear, associate dean of Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, said statements from Southeast Asian nations have been “lukewarm” at best due to concern for overseas workers, students studying in Russia and weapons deals.

“What it says to me is they don’t want to touch this with a 10-foot pole in terms of sticking their necks out,” Ear said. “Only Singapore has been willing to join the sanctions regime and do something about it. I’d say everybody else is looking down at their shoes and making vacuous statements.”

Abuza also singled out Singapore as the “only country in Southeast Asia that has taken a strong and principled position” against the invasion.

“They understand the very dangerous legal precedent the Russian invasion sets,” Abuza said. “The alteration of borders by force, the invasion and decapitation of a country’s leadership, the neutralisation of a state at gunpoint. Russia’s actions create a terrible precedent for small states, and sadly most Southeast Asian states have been largely in denial.”

The economics of war

The potential financial implications for Southeast Asia are mixed, although analysts seem to agree military transactions and fuel prices are the obvious contenders.

Nguyen Khac Giang, a doctoral candidate focusing on Vietnam and Asian affairs at the Victoria University of Wellington, said Vietnam has an important economic stake in Russia beyond arms sales. Many Vietnamese live and work there, while the loss of Russian travellers will be a blow to tourist businesses as Vietnam reopens following Covid-19 restrictions.

Daniel predicted possible short-term to midterm price impacts on food in Malaysia, which uses Russia and Ukraine as major sources of wheat and grain. Abuza also said regional wheat prices could soar and are likely to hit Indonesia hard, while Thailand could see a dip in tourism.

Approximately 17,600 Russians travelled to Thailand in February, which the Public Health Ministry said was 8.6% of total visitors. Those numbers dropped off after the 24 February invasion, in part because of credit card companies and airlines joining sanctions. About 6,500 Russian and 1,000 Ukrainians tourists have remained in Thailand, although some are struggling to pay their tabs without credit cards, The Associated Press reported on 13 March.

But Abuza stressed there is limited trade between Russia or Ukraine and Southeast Asia and very little Russian investment. Global markets rather than Russian action will raise energy prices. There will be a military impact on Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, which tops ASEAN trade with Russia, although still not as much as Vietnam’s transactions with neighbouring Cambodia.

“I can’t emphasise enough how unimportant Russia is to the region economically, with perhaps the exception of money laundering,” Abuza said.

President Joe Biden on 8 March announced a halt to U.S. imports of Russian oil, an attempt to hamper Russian cash flow and force a military withdrawal. The U.S. increased the pressure on 11 March, removing Russia’s ‘most favoured nation’ trading status and banning imports of Russian alcohol, diamonds and seafood. A Kremlin spokesman accused the American government of launching “an economic war” on Russia. 

The European Union also has issued targeted economic sanctions on Russia and its ally, Belarus, and is considering Ukraine’s request to accelerate its EU membership application.

Myers said the oil ban by the U.S. and the United Kingdom, which plans to discontinue imports by year’s end, could also impact Southeast Asia economies as higher global energy costs slow growth and raise consumer prices.

“Growing pressure on Russian energy firms may also cause actors in Southeast Asia to question Russia’s role in energy extraction in the region,” Myers said.

Kembara of CSIS said there might be a financial benefit for ASEAN. “As more and more Western nations sanction and boycott Russian-made products and commodities, this will push them to find commodities from alternative markets such as Southeast Asian nations,” he said.

Ear of Arizona State University, a Cambodian native and political specialist, said some Cambodians believe invasions can be “liberatory,” stemming from Vietnam’s 1979 move into Cambodia that ultimately defeated the Khmer Rouge and was subsequently celebrated as Liberation Day or Victory Day.

That is not the case in Ukraine, he said. 

“There is no regime that has enslaved its people like the Khmer Rouge did that needed to be removed and decapitated,” Ear said. “This is not the same situation, even if someone delusional might say it is.”

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