Eubank, 61, is the founder and leader of the Free Burma Rangers, an eclectic band of former U.S. Marines seeking new purpose, Myanmar ethnic minorities and rebels with a cause. Since 1996, the nonprofit group has gradually built a following throughout Myanmar with backing from local leaders, documenting war crimes carried out by the national military while distributing humanitarian aid. 

Eubank spoke with the Globe from a car driving outside Lutsk, Ukraine, a country that his organisation has recently entered. As the road rumbled and the connection cracked, Eubank spoke about the intense fighting in Ukraine, then switched to talk of Texas and the Alamo, a symbol of independence now nearly two centuries old. 

“I believe in the whole thing of freedom to this day,” he said.

Eubank is a devout Christian raised in Thailand by missionary parents. He and his wife, Karen Eubank, made faith and family central to their organisation, which also draws from David’s own experience as a former member of the elite U.S. Army Rangers and Special Forces.

The couple has raised three children across various conflict zones – now in young adulthood, the trio help their parents run family programmes in the field while on university breaks. With Eubank’s dual role as a combat-trained philanthropist and a spiritual leader who performs baptisms and other rites, he eludes any easy description. 

“You don’t surrender to fear or comfort or pride or the threats of the enemy,” Eubank said, adding that he only surrenders to love and God.

In Myanmar, decades of civil war and international isolation have created severe barriers to humanitarian aid. That already challenging landscape was further exacerbated after the 2021 coup that ousted the elected government of state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and unleashed a brutal chapter of widespread violence and lawlessness under yet another junta.

Amidst the scorched-earth campaign waged by the national military in its struggle to maintain control of the country, Eubank’s Rangers may be distinctly well-suited to fill a vacuum of service provision and information-gathering around Myanmar. 

Eubank said the quasi-clerical yet diverse humanitarian group operates with “no safety rules”. The organisation’s website states a total of 59 rangers have been killed since the group’s beginning. Though some died from disease, most were documented as perishing from gunshots, mortar attacks, air strikes or other actions by the Myanmar armed forces.

You don’t have to have any religion. As long as you do this for love, you don’t run, and you can read and write in some language to get the news out, you can be a Ranger.”

David Eubank

The Rangers focus on three key areas, according to Eubank. These are providing humanitarian aid such as food, shelter, clothing and medical assistance; documenting atrocities through interviews, photos and videos for media dissemination; and offering a range of trainings, from emergency medical care and logistics to what might be tactical instruction on landmine clearance and battlefield communication.

“Now there are about 150 teams deployed in every part of Burma, representing 16 ethnic groups,” Eubank said. “You don’t have to have any religion. As long as you do this for love, you don’t run, and you can read and write in some language to get the news out, you can be a Ranger.”

Though Myanmar is central to the group’s purpose, its website and prolific social media channels document missions abroad.

With an address in the U.S. city of Colorado Springs and a post office box in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the Rangers describe themselves as “a multi-ethnic humanitarian service movement working to bring help, hope and love to people in the conflict zones of Burma, Iraq and Sudan”.

Financial records on the Rangers’ website declare about 2,800 donors, mostly private individuals, churches and organisations donating to the group’s tax-exempt public charity, Free the Oppressed. For the last fiscal year, the organisation received more than $7 million for everything from medical supplies and cameras, to Bibles and Ranger-branded t-shirts. 

The group’s nonprofit revenue nearly tripled from 2020 to 2021 following the military coup in Myanmar.

Aside from records, the Rangers’ website is full of regular updates on the intense civil warfare following the coup – including graphic images from the scenes of massacres reportedly committed by the national armed forces. The military has in turn claimed the volunteer organisation “was formed by Vietnam War veterans [and] are in fact militants” who train ethnic armed groups to attack its bases.

Eubank denies these accusations and has long maintained his focus is on protecting the public, not confronting the military.

“Of course, I’m angry. Of course, I’m going to support the people against [the military]. But I also pray for them, their hearts to change,” he said.

Although Thai was Eubank’s first language as a child, he was born in the U.S. and later returned there for university in Texas. He joined the U.S. Army after that, serving as an Army Ranger reconnaissance platoon leader for counter-narcotics missions in Central and South America before joining the Special Forces.

Eubank left the military service in 1992 and entered seminary school. As he tells it, about a year after that, representatives of the Wa people – who hold a powerful, two-region enclave in Myanmar along the Thai and Chinese borders – reached out to Eubank’s missionary father to request his help. 

That would be the start of the family’s work in Myanmar.

We’re not a militia or an army, but we’re not pacifist. … If you have your own weapon, then you can take it. But you can’t use it except for defending [internally displaced persons] or yourself.” 

David Eubank

From their founding in 1996, the Free Burma Rangers have worked closely with ethnic armed organisations, including the Karen National Liberation Army and the Kachin Independence Army. These groups safeguard the Rangers, many of whom share the same ethnic backgrounds. 

In return, the Rangers typically provide expertise and training in field medicine. The organisation has trained more than 7,000 people to date. Eubank said the group does not provide arms or military training to its members or to ethnic armies – but also doesn’t forbid anyone from carrying guns.

“We’re not a militia or an army, but we’re not pacifist,” Eubank said. “If you have your own weapon, then you can take it. But you can’t use it except for defending [internally displaced persons] or yourself.”

Eubank himself was filmed taking up arms against ISIS fighters during the liberation of Mosul in 2017 in a documentary about the Rangers from a Christian production studio.

One wounded ranger from the battle claimed Eubank killed three fighters, even after he was shot in the arm. 

In Myanmar, Eubank’s policy is to get close to but avoid the military.

Still, the diplomatic concern of Rangers potentially acting as gunrunners for ethnic rebels in Myanmar has been documented in leaked cables transmitted to the Bangkok and Yangon embassies from the U.S. State Department. 

In one mishap, Eubank was caught on camera wearing a partial U.S. military uniform at a Shan National Day Rally, an annual festival where political and military leaders of the Shan people recognise and celebrate self-determination. According to the cable, this allegedly generated the perception the Rangers were providing weapons to the Shan State Army. 

The cable also suggested this incident – along with some disagreements between Eubank and the State Department over Thai refugee policy – prompted the department to limit contact with the Rangers and instruct Eubank to resign from the U.S. Army Reserve. Later, the Myanmar government claimed the photo of Eubank in uniform was evidence that the U.S. military was working with Shan militants and summoned the Defense Attache in Yangon over the issue.

While there is no evidence that the Rangers funnel weapons to rebels, State Department investigators stated in the cable they “believe there are other individuals who do help armed ethnic groups in Burma procure weapons, some of whom are former U.S. military. Due to the nature of his work, Eubank is probably aware of who they are and precisely what activities they are engaged in.” 

Generally around the world, small communities of ex-U.S. military personnel volunteering to enter foreign conflicts have caused some – such as former Human Rights Watch researcher David Scott Mathieson – to suggest “war zones (like in Myanmar) attract a rogue’s gallery of adventurers, fantasists and psychopaths. Eubank and his Free Burma Rangers (FBR) have been called all those and more.”

But Mathieson acknowledged that those who find the group’s faith-fueled humanitarian work off-putting cannot go so far as to claim that the Rangers have been ineffective.

Flitting between frontlines, Eubank doesn’t shy from the martial realities of his calling. When asked about balancing love against vengeance, he spoke about a form of justice that requires punishment motivated by the former.

“Justice has to have love in it so that when someone has done something wrong, the punishment must be one of love,” Eubank said. “That might be imprisonment or any number of other punishments to help them see the error of their ways. You might even have to shoot them, they might even die, but you’re just going to kill their body, not their soul and that’s better than letting them continue – body and soul – to wreak havoc on others and themselves.”

The post Love, war and the Free Burma Rangers appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

Tharman Shanmugaratnam, a popular, long-time government minister of Tamil heritage, was chosen by a wide margin in September’s presidential election. When he was sworn into office on 14 September as Singapore’s ninth president, it was viewed as a momentous historical event – yet one that political observers find unlikely to impact the island nation in any meaningful way.

“Everyone’s pretending like this election actually matters a lot, but frankly, it doesn’t,” said Michael Barr, an associate professor in international relations at Australia’s Flinders University.

Tharman is not the first member of an ethnic minority to become president, but he is the first to do so by winning a competitive election. That he did so by a landslide has made a compelling case that a strong candidate from an ethnic minority community can overcome race-based voting patterns on the strength of meritocratic achievement.

Much of Singapore’s electoral system has been designed on the assumption that this is not possible. Instead, positions reserved for ethnic minority candidates have been used to ensure their participation in government. Indeed, concerns of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) around the electability of a non-Chinese candidate are one of the reasons Tharman may have run for president rather than being a potential future prime minister for Singapore, said Barr.

In winning the presidential election with 70.4% of the vote, Tharman had to secure at least a plurality of the votes from Singapore’s Chinese community. During the presidential campaign, Tharman stated that “Singapore is ready any time for a non-Chinese prime minister.” His electoral performance has helped back this assertion.

“Many of us would project and believe that Singapore has matured politically, believing in the meritocratic system and multiracialism, that someone who’s non-Chinese can still win in an election which is open,” said Bilveer Singh, an associate professor in the faculty of political science at the National University of Singapore (NUS). “Tharman has proven [that belief].”

Though the election results do have the potential to make a lasting impact on Singapore’s ethnic politics, restraints on the president’s power limit the actual impact of the office.

Since 1991, when Singapore changed to an elected presidency, the role has become largely irrelevant from the perspective of government policy or electoral politics. The role is actually one many Singaporeans felt Tharman was overqualified for, given his long and storied career. The graduate of the London School of Economics, Cambridge and Harvard universities worked his way up through the Monetary Authority of Singapore to become its managing director. 

When he transitioned into electoral politics in 2001, he was immediately made a government minister and has since served as both a deputy prime minister and senior minister with portfolios including education and finance.  

During his time in government he broke with the PAP’s deep-rooted opposition to welfare in order to secure increased state support for the poor and the elderly. 

“I think he is seen as a champion of the people,” said Singh.

The role of the presidency was originally conceived as ceremonial, not unlike a governor-general in British commonwealth nations. Distinguished, often ethnic-minority Singaporeans would be appointed to the position to represent the country in diplomatic functions. 

“The job started off in 1991 as what looked like a very important job, but it has become so restrained by the council of presidential advisors and all these new rules they’ve introduced.”

Michael Barr, associate professor at Australia’s Flinders University

When a constitutional amendment established presidential elections three decades ago, the position was endowed with substantial powers. The president could unilaterally veto any attempt to draw down the country’s reserves and withhold approval on the appointment of key figures within the civil service. As conceived by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, it was viewed as a powerful check on the government in the event that an unexpected election result handed power to the PAP’s opposition, with an electoral mandate to legitimise the president’s authority. 

Soon after the system of direct elections was implemented, though, “the government realised that this spectre of a so-called freak election result was less and less likely to occur”, said Kevin Tan, an adjunct professor in the law faculty of NUS and editor-in-chief of the Asian Journal of Comparative Law.

Since then, the office has been gradually stripped of the ability to exercise discretionary powers in a meaningful way so that it would not be able to restrict the authority of a PAP-led government, according to Barr, leaving the job once again largely ceremonial.

“The job started off in 1991 as what looked like a very important job, but it has become so restrained by the council of presidential advisors and all these new rules they’ve introduced.  It’s just a showpiece now,” Barr said.

While the position of president is intended to be a non-partisan one, the fact that the post is the only position directly elected by the entire population of Singapore has encouraged many to view the outcome along political lines. Tharman was viewed by many as having an unspoken endorsement from the PAP, while candidate Tan Kin Lian, a businessman and past presidential candidate, receiving public endorsements from the leaders of opposition parties. 

However, candidate eligibility criteria that leave only government ministers, senior officials appointed by the government, and the leaders of Singapore’s largest corporations able to run have made it all but impossible for a candidate that could credibly be called “opposition” to contest the election in the first place. 

As a result, said Barr, this year’s election featured a slate of three candidates who – despite portraying themselves as independent – were all more or less part of the PAP establishment. Even Tan Kin Lian, who presented himself as “an anti-establishment opposition candidate,” was not truly independent of the PAP: “He’s just not as far in,” said Barr.

Without a genuine opposition candidate, those who challenge the government cannot really “lose” the election. On the other hand, because of Tharman’s charismatic popularity, a vote for him does not equate to a vote for the PAP.

“Tharman has always outperformed the PAP, even in every general election,” said Singh.

Even still, he added that Tharman is too unique an individual for parallels to be drawn with other ethnic minority figures currently on the Singaporean political stage, making it unlikely that anyone will be able to follow in his footsteps for the foreseeable future. 

“Tharman is just too much of a charismatic leader that every Singaporean loves and knows him for what he is. So I don’t think the Tharman effect can be replicated elsewhere by another figure,” Singh said.

The post In presidential election, Singapore breaks ethnic-based voting patterns appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

Dead or alive, in the case of Nguyen Van Chuong it’s anyone’s guess.

Fifteen years after Nguyen was sentenced to death in the northern Vietnamese port city of Hai Phong, his family still doesn’t know when he’ll be injected with deadly poison – or even if it’s already happened.

“I received a notice of the execution of the death sentence of my son Nguyen Van Chuong, meaning that the Court of Hai Phong City has insisted on killing my son,” wrote Chuong’s father, Nguyen Truong Chinh, to the court in a 4 August letter also posted to Facebook. “Thus, I am writing this letter to respectfully request relevant authorities to review the case and rescue my son from injustice.”

That day, he’d gotten a call that no father ever wants – the court had asked whether he wanted his son’s body and belongings returned after his execution. The family patriarch was told he must apply in writing within three days to recover his son’s corpse or ashes, though he wasn’t told if the execution was scheduled or had already been carried out.

He has been demonstrating holding posters in front of the court’s building ever since.

“Dear friends who love justice and freedom, please share [this crusade] to help prisoner Nguyen Van Chuong,” read one of his banners.

The younger Nguyen, 40, has been on death row since 2008 for the alleged murder of a high-ranking police officer in 2007. His case caught the attention of prominent Vietnamese lawyers who have argued for leniency in the face of alleged use of torture by police to extract a confession as well as other apparent irregularities in Nguyen’s conviction.

When he was first sentenced to death in 2008, Nguyen’s lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court. But the case was quickly rejected, igniting public sentiment over the alleged unfairness of the trial. The pushback on the sentence – and the seemingly imminent execution – has cracked the shield of secrecy that buffers news about such cases in Vietnam, where rights groups say judges have handed out death sentences with increasing regularity in recent years.

Vietnam is one of 55 countries worldwide that continue to sentence citizens to death. According to Amnesty International, many executions go unreported because “secrecy and restrictive state practices” prevent an accurate assessment. The humanitarian agency estimated a 30% increase in capital punishment in Vietnam from 2020 to 2021, with more than 119 death sentences handed out in that latter year.

That would put the country behind only China and Iran in using the death penalty.

From the moment of his arrest, Nguyen and two other men accused of being accomplices in the killing were reportedly handcuffed, beaten and threatened until they confessed to the crime, despite having no apparent link to the officer’s murder.

Nguyen had strong alibi witnesses who swore under oath that they were with him in his hometown, Hai Duong, about 40 kilometres away from the attack. But rather than investigate the alibi, authorities quickly arrested Nguyen’s younger brother, Nguyen Trong Doan, for manipulating evidence and witnesses.

The authorities concluded the three accused had robbed and murdered the officer for money to buy heroin. While Nguyen went to death row, the other two were given lengthy prison sentences.

“According to the latest information we have, he’s still alive and he’s received the notice for his execution,” said Nadia Ivanova, director of People in Need’s centre for human rights and democracy, one of the 13 signatories of an open letter to the Vietnamese president calling for an immediate halt to Nguyen’s execution. “His family managed to pay a visit to his prison a few days after the announcement.”

But even as public interest in the case has stood out, discussions have been strictly limited to informal channels, said Ivanova.

“What struck us as really concerning about this case is that since August 4 — the notification day — there has been almost no national media coverage on the case or about the notification itself. The information mainly came from social media; from the Facebook post by his family,” she said.

In 2013, when the Supreme Court rejected Nguyen’s appeal, several lawyers and human rights defenders identified inconsistencies and procedural violations in the investigation, trial and appeal phases of his case. These include inconsistencies in forensic evidence analysis, disputed attributions of weapons and knives, contradictions in witness statements and a lack of investigation into Nguyen’s alibi, including phone records.

Some rights experts also believe he’s just a scapegoat.

“We believe that the victim had some problems with another officer over a career promotion,” said Le Cong Dinh, a human rights lawyer and former vice president of the Ho Chi Minh Bar Association. “It’s likely that the other police officer is the murderer. But the authorities accused [Nguyen] of concealing this case.”

Vietnam applies capital punishment for 22 offences, including murder, armed robbery, drug trafficking, rape, child sexual abuse and economic crimes such as corruption. The death penalty is most often used for drug-related crimes, with heroin and opium possession or smuggling punishable by death, but capital punishment is almost as often handed down in major corruption cases and violent crimes.

“We raised lots of voices against death in custody in Vietnam because of torture. But I don’t see any changes in the future, because this is the way Vietnam investigates criminal cases.”

Le Cong Dinh, human rights lawyer

This time, there has been an unfamiliar expression of public concern that Nguyen’s trial was unfair and that he may have been tortured to extract a confession.

“Vietnamese people don’t normally have strong reactions to death-penalty cases. But this is one of those rare times when the public became very proactive on social media, calling for justice and the re-examination of the case,” said Nguyen Khac Giang, a Vietnamese political expert and visiting fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS).

Of no familial relation to the convict, Nguyen cited the general belief there may have been a serious breach of due process including potentially even torture in the interrogations leading to “a forced admission of guilt”.

“When you go to court [in Vietnam], it’s nearly 100% sure that judges have already decided the verdict before you actually stand trial,” he said. “Also, there’s a lot unknown about this case, especially the way the authorities and the prosecutors carried out the investigation.”

There’s no going back from a wrongful execution, said Le from the Bar Association, adding that the only way to solve both the torture and unjust execution issues is to remove the practice altogether from Vietnam’s legal system.

“We raised lots of voices against death in custody in Vietnam because of torture. But I don’t see any changes in the future, because this is the way Vietnam investigates criminal cases,” Le said.

“I have no hope for future changes. The only thing we can hope to do is to remove the death sentence. We don’t want any death. If we have other evidence we have time to rescue the person.”

Nguyen of ISEAS is more optimistic. He believes his country has made progress over the years, also noting Vietnam’s adoption of new regulations to adjust to international standards of justice and due process. Among these is a national requirement for interrogation rooms to have voice recorders and multiple witnesses present.

Such measures could bode well for a more transparent court process moving forward. But for now, the family of the condemned Nguyen remains hanging in limbo – the life of their son and brother hanging in the balance.

The post In Vietnam, a controversial planned execution strains death penalty appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

These results hardly came as a surprise. They were made possible by the systematic crackdown on opposition groups, independent journalists, and fundamental freedoms the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) has been conducting since 2017. Unsurprisingly, a chorus of international voices dubbed the election as “neither free nor fair,” only for the RGC to brush this criticism aside. Most notably, seven UN Special Rapporteurs called the polls “very unbalanced,” stating that “repressive practices” had seriously undermined human rights and the promise of liberal democracy. 

There is no denying that Cambodia has been a de facto one-party state since 2018, which saw the CPP win every single National Assembly seat. This followed the dissolution of the main opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) just months after it secured nearly 44% of the vote in the 2017 commune elections. CNRP figures were later handed lengthy prison sentences in mass trials that raised serious due process and impartiality concerns. 

History tends to repeat itself, and it certainly did in 2023: the opposition Candlelight Party (CP), the only formation that posed a credible threat, was barred from contesting. Several CP activists were assaulted in broad daylight, others were arrested and charged with vaguely worded offences. Restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and access to information were further tightened to silence dissenting narratives. In other words, the outcome was never in doubt. 

Respect for human rights took a backseat as the country grew more and more authoritarian. Over the years, the Cambodian parliament rubber-stamped a series of legal provisions to introduce severe restrictions on fundamental freedoms and ramp up online restrictions. These were adopted with little to no public debate, illustrating a disregard for democratic checks and balances. The RGC also shut down or brought independent media under control to prevent unfavorable reporting, and targeted dissenting voices using intimidation tactics, judicial harassment, threats, and violence. These systematic actions, which show no sign of abating, have hindered political plurality, led to the disenfranchisement of a huge portion of the Cambodian population, and deterred citizens from exercising their freedoms. 

The total absence of democratic oversight allowed endemic corruption and clientelism to flourish. Policy decisions gradually became mere tools to serve the ruling elite and their economic interests. This contributed to the persistence of severe social inequalities, limited protections for workers, land grabs, and the unchecked exploitation of natural resources. In a context of restricted civil society space, the lack of political representation of workers and communities faced with rights violations makes it extremely difficult for them to access redress mechanisms, or merely advocate for fairer policies. Human rights defenders, unions, and land activists are routinely treated as enemies of the state; and the threat of prison is real.

As he takes the reins as prime minister, Hun Manet is standing at a crossroads. He can opt for the status quo and embrace the strongman politics that led to the current human rights crisis, or he can preside over a shift towards more inclusive forms of governance based on respect for fundamental freedoms, political pluralism, and social justice. If Hun Manet ambitions to comply with Cambodia’s international obligations and the spirit of its constitution, he will have no choice but to choose the second path. In this regard, the first 100 days of his tenure will be placed under particular scrutiny. Below are a series of urgent issues his government should address if it wants to show a genuine willingness to improve the country’s human rights situation.

Release political prisoners and detained human rights defenders

On 12 July, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated that human rights activist Seng Theary, who is currently serving a six-year prison sentence for conspiracy to commit treason, had been “arbitrarily detained” due to “her long-term, high-profile criticism of the prime minister and her pro-democracy activism.” 

She is far from being the only one. According to the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), there are currently 53 “prisoners of interest” in the Kingdom. Among them are 25 opposition figures, including 12 CP officials and former CNRP president Kem Sokha, who in March was handed a 27-year treason sentence following a “politically motivated” trial “fraught with irregularities.”

Every single day they spend in prison is another failure by Cambodia to meet its international obligations. The new government must put an end to the practice of viewing political opponents and human rights defenders as threats to be neutralised, and take the necessary steps to release all those arbitrarily arrested and wrongfully convicted for exercising their rights and freedoms. In the spirit of political reconciliation, it should also declare an amnesty for the politicians in exile who wish to return to Cambodia.

Restore banned media outlets and free detained journalists

Since 2017, systematic censorship and restrictive laws have decimated what used to be a vibrant media landscape, and this trend shows no sign of reversing. Earlier this year, the RGC shut down Voice of Democracy, one of Cambodia’s last remaining independent media outlets over a story alleging that Hun Manet had signed an official document in lieu of his father. It also revoked the licenses of three Khmer language online media outlets that reported on the involvement of a government official in a land fraud case; and blocked access to the websites and social media accounts of Cambodia Daily, Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Kamnotra just days before this year’s general election.

At the very least, the new government should release the three journalists that are currently detained in Cambodia because of their reporting, reinstate the outlets that were shut down this year, and lift any restrictions preventing the public from accessing news sites. Once these preliminary steps have been taken, it should conduct consultations with relevant stakeholders on how to create a protective environment for journalists and undertake genuine efforts to promote press freedom. 

Side with victims in labour disputes and land grabs

Among Cambodia’s “prisoners of interest” are also union leader Chhim Sithar and 27 land activists. Their crimes? Exercising their fundamental freedoms to demand fair solutions to labour disputes and land conflicts. As the president of the Labor Rights Supported Union of Khmer Employees of NagaWorld (LRSU), Chhim Sithar has been at the forefront of a non-violent strike to demand the reinstatement of dismissed NagaWorld employees since December 2021. Authorities responded by subjecting strikers to violence on numerous occasions, before ultimately slapping Sithar and eight other LRSU members with incitement sentences in May. No settlement was ever reached. 

The same treatment is routinely applied to land activists. On 15 August, the Koh Kong Provincial Court sentenced 10 of them to one year in prison in connection to a land dispute involving a high-profile tycoon. All were arrested as they were trying to travel to Phnom Penh to petition the Ministry of Justice.

This is but one example among many. Instead of addressing the root causes of land grabs, such as the lack of formal land titles, poorly enforced legislation, and endemic corruption, authorities have consistently sided with developers and targeted the communities affected. In doing so, they confirmed that they see any attempt at exercising one’s fundamental freedoms as a threat that needs to be quashed.

If it wants to work towards greater social justice, the new government must hold perpetrators of labour and land rights violations to account, not side with them.

Stop granting economic land concessions and offer fair compensation to the communities affected by development projects

Last November, the RGC adopted a sub-decree making over 930,000 hectares of public land inside protected conservation areas eligible for privatisation. The move raised serious concerns, as it followed the awarding of a new Economic Land Concession (ELC) to a South Korean company in March 2022; the first in nearly a decade. Almost 400 families could be impacted by the concession. Between the 1990s and 2014, the government granted over 200 ELCs covering more than two million hectares of land to private actors, leading to mass evictions and large-scale deforestation and rights abuses before a moratorium on new applications was introduced in 2012. 

The previous administration also leaves behind a legacy of so-called development projects implemented with little to no regard for their impact on the environment or the local communities. Most notably, the RGC sold or gifted most of Boeung Tamok, Phnom Penh’s biggest natural lake, to politically connected individuals or government institutions over the last few years. It is now being filled in for real estate development, a process that could ultimately lead to the eviction of roughly 1,200 people. Other lakes around the capital have faced or are set to share the same fate, which will likely exacerbate flood intensity in the city. Similarly, the construction of a new airport in Kandal Province will soon result in the displacement of over 400 families. Evictees typically have no say and are often compensated inadequately. 

The new government should therefore review all pending eviction cases to ensure that the people affected by development projects are offered fair compensation and strictly adhere to the 2012 moratorium on ELCs to protect the country’s natural resources and prevent other eviction crises. Unlike its predecessor, the new administration should take the necessary measures to make sure that development initiatives do not negatively impact the environment and the livelihoods of local communities. In other words, it must shift from economic policies serving the ruling elite and their interests to policies serving the greater good.

Convene the National Congress

The dissolution of the CNRP and disqualification of the CP from the 2023 general election have led to the disenfranchisement of a significant portion of the Cambodian population; effectively depriving them of political representation or a meaningful say in decision-making. Fortunately, articles 147 to 149 of the constitution enable all Khmer citizens to raise issues with and formulate requests to State authorities via an annual National Congress, which shall be convened by the prime minister and meet in early December. Despite the importance of this democratic participation tool, former Prime Minister Hun Sen never convened it, and even argued that “holding it could cause turmoil in the system.” The new prime minister should break with this approach and clearly announce his intention to convene a National Congress in 2023. It is time for the RGC to abide by the constitution and give back their voice to the people.

The preamble of the Cambodian constitution envisions the Kingdom as an “Island of Peace,” based on a multi-party liberal democratic regime that guarantees human rights and the rule of law. Whether the country can live up to these ambitious expectations is now in the hands of the new prime minister. Cambodia is watching.

Chak Sopheap is the executive director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights and a peace studies graduate of the International University of Japan.

The post A 100-day checklist for the new Cambodian prime minister to turn human wrongs into human rights appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

The party is now in disarray. Former party leader Jurin Laksanawisit resigned after the polls and now, three months later, the party has repeatedly failed to find a new leader amidst a fierce internal power struggle.

The Democrats’ demise is long in the making. The reasons for this are many – the abandonment of the party’s namesake principles, an unresolved identity crisis woven with inconsistent political stands and the emergence of more hardline conservative parties such as Palang Pracharath and Ruam Thai Sang Chart (UTNP) are to blame for the group’s fatal decline.

This downfall into irrelevance could serve as a doomsday reminder for its former archrival Pheu Thai. The May elections were also the first time in 20 years that Pheu Thai and former shells affiliated with ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra did not come out of the poll as the top party. 

The long-standing electoral champion collected 141 seats as the runner-up to the more youthful Move Forward. Despite winning 151 seats, the reformist party seems likely to be muscled out of the ruling coalition by the military-backed conservative establishment.

Like the Democrats, Pheu Thai is a remnant of the old-fashioned political era. Thaksin and his family – most recently his daughter Paetongtarn – remain central to the party’s political manoeuvring and decision making. In the years past, Pheu Thai has not shown efforts to build itself and refurbish its political branding beyond the Shinawatra clan to adapt to new demographics of the Thai electorate. 

Despite suffering endless cycles of political persecutions, bloody crackdowns on protesting supporters and two military coups ousting its elected government in the past 20 years, Pheu Thai appears to be repeating its own mistakes – and, even worse, walking in the Democrats’ footsteps to failure. 

Heeding the conservative camp’s relentless endeavour to block Move Forward and its charismatic leader Pita Limjaroenrat from forming a government, Pheu Thai recently jumped ship from the progressive-led coalition pact and has optimistically established a new coalition with the would-be kingmaker Bhumjaithai Party. 

They’ll start with a combined 238 seats in the lower house along with Chart Thai Pattana Party, another junior partner. But they’re still far behind the 376 seats required for the simple majority threshold in the House of Representatives’ joint session with the unelected 250-member Senate. 

Such a number can never be reached unless the Pheu Thai-Bhumjaithai coalition brings in other conservative and military-affiliated parties alike, including the Democrats, the UTN and Palang Pracharath.

The latter two have ex-junta leaders Prayut Chan-ocha and Prawit Wongsuwon as patriarchs, respectively. It is especially note-worthy that Prayut and Prawit still have political influence on the senators handpicked by them when they were heads of the now-defunct junta National Council for Peace and Order.

Let alone reconciling with ultra-conservative and military-affiliated parties, even Pheu Thai’s infamous “mint-choc” partnership with Bhumjaithai appears problematic. The party was only formed in late 2008 by founder Newin Chidchobas through a sudden turn from Pheu Thai’s predecessor pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party.

Newin, an-ex minister in Thaksin’s government famously told the populist senior politician: “It’s over, boss!” before leading a number of like-minded parliamentarians to leave the party, form Bhumjaithai and join former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrats to form an unpopular government in 2009. In the eyes of Pheu Thai and Redshirt supporters even until recent elections, Bhumjaithai has always been untrustworthy and a symbol of betrayal. 

During the street protest in May 2010, it was Abhisit who ordered a bloody crackdown on the protesters killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 2000. Although the Thai court already dismissed all the charges against Abhisit, Redshirts still demand accountability from the Democrats. 

Equally important, after the 2014 military coup ousted the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, the resulting junta arrested and detained several Pheu Thai supporters for protesting the takeover. Some activists, including academics, reporters and commentators fled the country for fear of being arrested and jailed. Several years later, justice is still remotely far for them.

Looming large over Pheu Thai’s unpopular hedging position is Thaksin’s planned return to Thailand after 15 years in exile. With his daughter Paetongtarn likely one of Pheu Thai’s prime-ministerial candidates, the 74-year-old is still a big factor for the party. Rumours have that he had struck a deal with the pro-establishment camp to form a government without Move Forward and abandon the latter’s agendas – such as reforming the lèse-majesté law, which prohibits speech deemed critical of the monarchy – in exchange for leniency upon his eventual return home.

If the rumour is true or Pheu Thai managed to form a government without Move Forward, the modern-day politics of Thailand have nearly completed a full circle. 

From mid-2000s to 2014, conservative camps used all means at their disposal, including two military coups, to stamp out Thaksin, his proxy parties and allies from the centre of power. After almost a decade under junta rule and elected but military-friendly governments, a far-left camp emerged under the late Future Forward and the current Move Forward parties to become a new opponent of the pro-establishment camp. 

To block this emerging rival from taking office, Thaksin is recast overnight as not that bad at all. His former enemies and rivals have even spoken highly of him, or at least described him as a lesser evil.

However, if this is the case, Pheu Thai can review the Democrats’ demise as a crystal ball showing its destiny yet to come.

The Democrats’ miscalculated disrespect of the electorate in the 2000s, along with its cooperation with the military in an attempt to wipe out the so-called Thaksin regime and later joining a military-friendly coalition in 2019 all played a significant role in its self-destruction. 

It might be still too early to evaluate if Pheu Thai’s departure from the original eight-party coalition to join hands with the conservative parties is rational and well-calculated.The party, however, still needs to very carefully explain its reasoning to its supporters. 

In the case of a government that excludes Move Forward, Pheu Thai still has a chance – perhaps a dwindling one – to introduce popular policies from the less-controversial progressive agenda.

Otherwise, the Democrats’ past might be the future of Pheu Thai. The Thai public, which voted for Move Forward and Pheu Thai and against the conservative style of national governance, is growing less patient and tolerant to any breaking of electoral promises or political flip-flopping. 

Maybe the ultimate question is how a Pheu Thai-led government would respond to possible massive street protests by Move Forward supporters. Would it trigger a military crackdown as the Democrat-led government did to Pheu Thai supporters in 2010? Only time will tell.

Sek Sophal holds a Master degree in Asia Pacific Studies from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan. He is a researcher at the Center for Democracy Promotion, Ritsumeikan Center for Asia Pacific Studies, as well as a contributing writer for Southeast Asia Globe.

Chhengpor Aun is a visiting fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is also a graduate student in the Master of International Affairs Programme at the Hertie School in Berlin.

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But while the incumbent governments in each of the states were able to hold onto power, the results still have the potential to shift power dynamics in a profound way at the national level.

The state elections have taken on national significance due to the inconclusive results of last year’s general election, said James Chin, a professor of Asian studies at the University of Tasmania. With no decisive winner, long-time rival coalitions Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) came together to form a unity government under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. 

Saturday’s elections were the first opportunity voters have had to show their support or disapproval of this government at the polls.

“The main reason it is widely seen by everybody in Malaysia, especially the political class, as a referendum on Anwar Ibrahim is because [in] last November’s election there were no winners,” Chin said.

While Anwar’s PH was able to hold its own among the electorate on Saturday, BN saw its support in the ethnic Malay community further erode as its traditional support base defected within the rising wave of support for opposition coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN). This further loss of Malay votes, while in line with the outcomes of the last general election, may have longer-lasting implications for Anwar’s government. 

Support for PH has been conspicuously low within the Malay community – the party received only 13% of the Malay vote in peninsular Malaysia during the last election. A show of support among the Malay community in this election was of particular importance for the Anwar’s government’s hopes of leading effectively, noted Chin.

“If the government is seen as not being Malay enough, or does not have the majority vote of the Malay community, then there are question marks about its legitimacy,” he said. “That will mean big problems for Anwar because it means that he doesn’t have the political capital to carry out fundamental reforms of the political and economic system.”

Identity politics has often played a key role in electoral cycles of the past. Such a mindset in last weekend’s election may have edged out questions of economic performance in some states, said Lee Hwok-Aun, a senior fellow and co-coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

“Perikatan’s stranglehold in the Northeast and Northwest, and major inroads into rural and mixed urban/rural constituencies in all states, despite unremarkable economic track records in Kedah and Kelantan, confirm that the coalition now dominates the Malay heartland,” he said. “PH-BN continued to win by wide margins in urban areas that have not distinctly improved economically. I would say identity politics as championed by multi-ethnic parties played a role there.” 

Identity politics aside, the largely status-quo result demonstrated the awkward coalition PH has formed with many of its old rivals has not overly damaged the party’s support among its core voter base. Still, the result far from guarantees these voters’ future support for a PH-BN coalition, according to Teck Chi Wong, a PhD candidate at the University of Queensland.

“The low transferability is not unexpected, but it could be part of an ice-breaking process,” Wong said. “Only time will tell.”

Despite being unable to flip control of any of the states with incumbent PH-BN governments, the opposition coalition PN was able to consolidate and further expand on the “green wave” they experienced in the general elections. The coalition – composed primarily of Islamist and Malay nationalist parties – was able to make inroads in all three government-controlled states. 

In Penang, they increased their representation in the state’s legislature from one seat to 11 seats; in Selangor from five seats to 22 seats; and in Negeri Sembilan from no seats to five seats. The party also further consolidated its position in the ‘Malay-Belt’ states of Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu by securing every seat in the Terengganu state legislature, all but three seats in Kedah and all but two in Kelantan.  

So far as the election was a referendum on Anwar’s government, PN clearly feels its performance was strong – or at least is projecting this message. The coalition’s chairman, former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, declared victory and called on the leaders of the PH-BN coalition to resign their positions at a press conference following the announcement of the election results in all six states.

“It is true that the state election is a referendum on the people’s rejection of the PH-BN collaboration,” Muhyiddin said. “Anwar Ibrahim and Ahmad Zahid Hamidi must take moral responsibility and resign as prime minister and deputy prime minister.” 

His coalition’s electoral gains in Malay constituencies came at the expense of BN and UMNO, the party which has historically represented the country’s Malay majority in government. The results mirrored those of the last general election, where UMNO underperformed due to voter dissatisfaction with the party’s perceived corruption problems. 

In last year’s general election, Wong said, this resulted in “a Malay revolt against UMNO” which drove many Malay voters to support PN as an alternative. As such, it was vital for UMNO to staunch the flow of Malay voters leaving the party in these state elections, both for the stability of the party and the unity government as a whole. 

“If UMNO is not able to penetrate the rural Malay heartland states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah, then the federal government will be unstable,” said Chin in an interview before the election.

Unfortunately for UMNO, they failed in this task. With the spectre of corruption still lingering over Malaysia’s “Grand Old Party”, UMNO won just 19 of the 108 seats it contested in the election. However, despite failing to deliver the Malay vote and with it the political capital Anwar needed to maintain a stable unity government, there are unlikely to be any serious repercussions within the party for UMNO leadership, said Wong.

“Although there will be (and are already) calls for Zahid Hamidi to step down as the party president, they are unlikely to turn into a strong movement within the party against Zahid,” he said. “Many leaders who are not happy with Zahid were already purged before the state elections; and within UMNO, the power is highly centralised in the hands of the president.” 

Ultimately, the weekend’s state elections reinforced many of the trends seen in November’s general election. But it is likely too early to tell whether Anwar and his unity government will be able to alter the country’s course.

“A lot of people are saying that eight months is too short a time for the government to try to convince these Perikatan supporters to change their minds,” said Chin. “The government simply does not have enough time to pursue new policies.”

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Analysts had speculated ahead of the move that Pheu Thai, the runner-up in the May elections, might drop its progressive counterpart in a bid to form a new government and end a political stalemate with the conservative establishment. 

But the Wednesday declaration still sparked anger and protests from supporters of Move Forward, the largest party in the Thai Parliament. After the announcement, demonstrators burned effigies soaked in fake blood in front of Pheu Thai’s Bangkok headquarters.

“I think this is much anticipated,” said Napon Jatusripitak, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, speaking of the break-up. “The only surprise factor is that it came earlier than expected.  Many observers thought that it would take one more round of voting before Pheu Thai had a strong enough justification to kick the Move Forward Party out of the coalition.”

Pheu Thai also stated Wednesday it would run Srettha Thavisin, a prominent businessman, as its prime minister candidate. On 4 August, parliamentarians will vote on Srettha’s candidacy in a joint session – appearing to close the door even more firmly on the chances of 42-year-old Move Forward party leader Pita Limjaroenrat, who was already rejected as a candidate in an earlier parliamentary vote. 

The move is the latest in an ongoing political drama that has consumed Thailand in the months since Move Forward’s surprising electoral success, which marked a strong public rejection of the previous military-backed government, a legacy of the 2014 coup. 

Move Forward and Pheu Thai had together been the foundation of an eight-party coalition that also included a cluster of six much smaller political parties. Now, despite being the largest party in Parliament, Move Forward will be pushed into the opposition by Pheu Thai’s decision. The break-up of the coalition is likely to deepen resentments of the conservative bloc – most notably the military-appointed Senate – among opposition supporters and could spark blowback on Pheu Thai among its own base.

In a bid to soften the blow of cutting out their more popular partner, Pheu Thai leaders said in a statement that they intended to adopt many elements of the excluded party’s progressive platform, including such points as ending military conscription and supporting LGBTQ+ rights. However, they made it explicitly clear that they did not intend to reform Thailand’s strict lèse-majesté law, which prohibits speech deemed critical of the monarchy. 

Move Forward has made amending the law, also known as Article 112 of the Criminal Code, a pillar of its campaign. This won the ire and resolute opposition of conservatives and had gradually driven a wedge between the party and some of the smaller parties of its coalition.

On 22 and 23 July, the leadership of Pheu Thai met with representatives from every major party outside the coalition – with the exception of the Democrat Party due to its current lack of leadership – to discuss what it would take for them to support a Pheu Thai candidate for prime minister. 

During these meetings and in press conferences afterwards, each of these parties made it clear they were willing to support a Pheu Thai candidate, but only if the coalition did not include Move Forward.  

Pheu Thai leader Cholnan Srikaew had publicly denied that the meetings and subsequent press conferences were intended as an indirect method of encouraging Move Forward to voluntarily leave the coalition so that Pheu Thai can form a government. But it now appears that is exactly what was happening.

“[Pheu Thai] is basically borrowing other parties as a mouthpiece to try to exclude the Move Forward Party,” said Napon, speaking before the Wednesday announcement made it official.

Whether the meetings were intended as political theatre or a genuine attempt to gauge support, the resolute opposition to Move Forward had left a slim-to-none chance of the eight-party coalition securing the 375 votes necessary to form a government, even if the party changed its divisive stance on the lèse-majesté law.

“Even if [Move Forward] were to withdraw on the pledge to amend Article 112, I don’t think the coalition can expect to gain more seats as long as the Move Forward party is still in the coalition,” Napon said last week.

With the path to government obstructed, tensions had simmered between the eight parties. Before the Wednesday announcement, the leaders of both the Seri Ruam Thai Party and the Plung Sungkom Mai Party called for annulment of the agreement that institutionalised the coalition.

However, the Thai Sang Thai and Fair parties sided with Move Forward and took the opposite position, proposing the coalition simply wait until next May when the Senate’s right to participate in the prime minister selection process expires. They could theoretically then vote Pita into office with their existing support in the lower house.

They will be making a deal with the devil, so to speak, by partnering with parties from the other side of Thailand’s bitter political divide.” 

James Buchanan, Thai politics analyst

Whatever the result of internal debates within the coalition, the unfolding attempt by Pheu Thai to put together a government that excludes Move Forward could be met with significant backlash by pro-democracy supporters of both parties.

“Many Move Forward voters also have a soft spot for Pheu Thai, and are probably former Pheu Thai voters,” wrote James Buchanan, an independent analyst of Thai politics, in a message to Globe before the Wednesday announcement. 

“Likewise, many Pheu Thai voters may also quite admire Move Forward. So it will be controversial if or when (I think ‘when’ far more likely) Pheu Thai decide to ditch Move Forward and try to form their own coalition. What makes it all the more controversial is that they will be making a deal with the devil, so to speak, by partnering with parties from the other side of Thailand’s bitter political divide.” 

Public hostility towards any alliance made across this divide had already begun to manifest before Wednesday’s announcement.  

On 23 July, protestors stormed a joint press conference held by Pheu Thai and Palang Pacharat, demanding the party stick to its previous commitments not to form a government that would include Palang Pacharat and United Thai Nation. The protestors also threw talcum powder at Pheu Thai leader Cholnan Srikaew and Palang Pacharat lawmaker Thamanat Prompowand, and questioned whether Pheu Thai had forgotten the bloody crackdowns on its supporters in 2010. 

Pheu Thai supporters had also begun to air their displeasure about such an alliance. Thida Thavornseth, a former chair of the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) – an activist organisation whose “Redshirts” have been some of the most active supporters of Pheu Thai – warned Pheu Thai about the consequence of breaking with Move Forward. 

In a Facebook post on 27 July she stated the Redshirts supported all parties with pro-democracy policies, not just Pheu Thai, and that if the party were to join forces with military-aligned parties the UDD would take its support elsewhere.

Even if Pheu Thai is able to effectively manage any backlash that comes from its decision to break with Move Forward, there is still no guarantee that Thailand’s conservative establishment will allow them to form a government, said Buchanan.

“Of course, there is always a chance that Pheu Thai are being strung along by the elites, whose long game is to form a government with neither Move Forward nor Pheu Thai,” he said.

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In June, his persistence led to a landmark moment with his ascension from an advisory role to become the deputy human rights minister to the National Unity Government (NUG). His appointment within the exiled civilian administration – which operates in parallel to the military junta that ousted democratically elected leaders in the 2021 coup – marks the first time a Rohingya representative has held a ministerial position in any Myanmar government.

“I believe that regardless of the challenges, you have all the capacity to be a victor,” he said. “It’s all a matter of how you transform yourself from a victim to a victor.” 

Aung Kyaw Moe has advocated for the rights of the stateless Muslim minority group for more than a decade. He has more than 15 years of experience working in U.N. agencies and non-governmental organisations in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and Liberia and won several human rights awards, including the prestigious E.U. Schuman Award in 2019.

But although he now has a say in the shadow government’s decisions, the establishment of Rohingya rights in Myanmar is far from straightforward. The embattled NUG still lacks control over territory in Myanmar and faces an authoritarian military that denies the Rohingya citizenship and basic rights. 

In 2017, the Myanmar military conducted a brutal crackdown on the predominantly Muslim majority, pushing more than 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. Today, about a million Rohingya refugees remain there, living in squalid camps with uncertain futures just over the border from their native Rakhine State in western Myanmar.

The persecution of the Rohingya minority is deeper-rooted still, dating back to warfare and displacement in the late 1700s. Later on, post-colonial religious segregation and discrimination caused this population to be considered illegal immigrants in their own country. The government of Myanmar officially categorised them as “Bengali” in 1982, stripping them of citizenship rights and forcing them to live without basic human rights ever since.

Born in Rakhine State in 1973, Aung Kyaw Moe witnessed decades of oppression and violence against the Rohingya people. He began activism as a student when the discriminatory policies against his ethnic group felt increasingly unfair.

“At that time, Rakhine State was an open prison with strict movement restrictions for people like us,” Aung Kyaw Mow said of his youth. “The inspiration [to work in human rights] came from the hardship and trauma.”

Despite growing up with limited educational opportunities due to his Rohingya identity and religious minority status, Aung Kyaw Moe managed to complete his bachelor’s degree in Yangon. But further education seemed to not be an option for him in Myanmar. 

“[As a Rohingya] there is a double layer of discrimination to overcome in order to truly become who you want to be and influence others,” he said. “I then began to look for alternative ways to achieve my goals.”

He went on to graduate with a master’s degree from Deakin University in Australia. He later participated in leadership programmes through the United States Institute of Peace and the Dalai Lama Fellowship.

Facing threats to his safety due to the nature of his advocacy for the Rohingya, Aung Kyaw Moe also fled Myanmar multiple times and separated from family members as early as 1992, with some of them staying in Rakhine, others fleeing to Yangon or neighbouring Bangladesh. Despite the difficulties, he continued activism while being in and out of the country, testifying about atrocities before the U.N. Human Rights Council and International Criminal Court. 

“It’s hardly acceptable for me. … We could have saved him from being killed.”

Aung Kyaw Moe, speaking of his elder brother 

But his choices also forced him to take a strong stand about cutting ties. Aung Kyaw Moe hasn’t been in touch with his close family members for years to ensure their anonymity and safety from persecution. 

That may not have been enough. Unknown assailants murdered his older brother Than Myint in June near a Yangon mosque. Aung Kyaw Moe believes the killers are likely affiliated with extremist groups linked to the military government. 

“He was just a simple person who was making his life through a small pharmacy that he ran,” he said of his brother. 

Though Than Myint had insisted that his younger brother not worry for his safety, Aung Kyaw Moe said he’d always been concerned about him. 

“It’s hardly acceptable for me because there were things I could do to push him to relocate to a different country, at least to Thailand,” he said. “We could have saved him from being killed.”

But his brother was not his only loss. Aung Kyaw Moe also lost his father in 2012. His father had been arrested and, shortly after his release, suffered an illness that left him paralysed. When he was unable to receive treatment at local hospitals, the family brought him to Bangladesh, where he received only palliative care until he felt strong enough to cross the border back to Myanmar. 

However, Aung Kyaw Moe said the reentry was disastrous – just a few steps on Myanmar soil were enough for his father to fear a new arrest so much that he immediately died of a heart attack.

“That was a big loss for me,” Aung Kyaw Moe recounted. “I was not able to go to the funeral because of the movement restrictions and my activism.”

Despite his immense suffering and hardships, the activist’s first-hand accounts of the crises facing the Rohingya brought global attention to their plight.

One of the most controversial decisions in the course of this, according to him, was whether to join the NUG three years ago as the first Rohingya advisor on human rights in parliament. Criticism came from some Rohingya commentators, who believed this to be just a tokenistic gesture to the international community.

But Aung Kyaw Moe stands by his involvement, seeing it as a stepping stone for the future of the Rohingya people.

“We belong to Myanmar and we are part of this country,” he asserted. “Despite whatever happens to us, we don’t want to be a bystander or audience in this historic moment. We will contribute in whatever capacity we are in.”

He sees the inclusion of a Rohingya representative in the cabinet-in-exile as a step towards giving the community a voice in decisions that affect their fate. Aung Kyaw Moe is now well-positioned to shape policy discussions on key issues including the safe return of refugees and restitution for lost lands and properties, as well as constitutional reforms to grant the Rohingya full citizenship and political representation.

Despite everything, Aung Kyaw Moe says he’s hopeful these goals and more can be achieved through non-violent civil disobedience.

“I’m someone who has scars and I know the pain enough to understand the suffering of others,“ he said. Because he went through similar experiences to his fellow Rohingya, he believes he can empathise better with the population in his new role as NUG deputy human rights minister. 

“I will be working for the benefit of my people,” he said. “It’s now on my shoulder to be making it a reality despite … all this political turmoil and shifting political landscape in Myanmar.”

The post ‘From victim to victor’: A Rohingya journey to Myanmar government appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

The rally ushered in an all-but-assured victory for Cambodia’s long-time Prime Minister Hun Sen in the 23 July national elections.

Hun Sen, who has ruled the country since 1985 and has spent close to four decades consolidating power, was noticeably absent. His eldest son and chosen successor, military commander Hun Manet, headlined the event.

“Today is our victorious day. Be ready to roll out the landslide motorcade for the political campaign across the capital,” said Manet, kicking off the rally in Phnom Penh. “We are fully committed to the policy of Samdech Techo [Lord] Hun Sen, who is the president of the party and has high accountability for the faith, future of the country and the people.”

Hundreds of motorbikes and dozens of cars rallied on Koh Pich, a neighbourhood in southern Phnom Penh also known as Diamond Island, in the early morning of 21 July. Southeast Asia Globe followed the motorcade as supporters drove into the heart of the capital.

In the past few months, the election campaign trail has been littered with crackdowns on rival political parties, prominent opposition leaders and independent news outlets. These ruling party tactics were honed in the lead-up to the most recent national elections in 2018, after the former opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) was forcibly dissolved the year prior.

This year, it was the Candlelight Party – a reconstituted version of the earlier opposition – that was snuffed out before the ballot. The party won about 22% of the popular vote in last year’s commune elections, a national contest in which Cambodians select local leadership, and was seen as the sole viable contender for this year’s poll. However, the National Election Committee disqualified the party in May on a paperwork requirement, knocking it out before the campaign season.

Candlelight officials declined to comment on the election when reached on Friday. A day earlier, party President Teav Vannol told Japanese media that “excluding the Candlelight Party is like killing democracy in our country.”

With opposition swept aside, Hun Sen has been relentlessly outspoken about the need for Cambodians to vote. Meanwhile, the CPP-dominated National Assembly has passed laws barring non-voters from running for office in the future, as well as criminalising calls to boycott the election.

The week before the election, police arrested four Candlelight members and accused them of urging others to spoil their ballots in protest. Authorities also convicted in absentia 17 members of the former CNRP – including long-time opposition leader Sam Rainsy – who are already living in exile after the court-ordered dissolution of their party and subsequent mass criminal trials of its members and supporters.

“Cambodians are thirsting for democracy and change. Hun Manet will simply be a continuation of a family dynasty,” said Rainsy, speaking to a reporter from Paris. “Regardless of which party they support, Cambodians are being denied their right to cast their vote in a free, fair and competitive election.”

There may be 18 parties listed on Sunday’s vote, but the 70-year-old Hun Sen is expected to mark a landslide victory. The CPP plans to form a new government in August. While Hun Sen has yet to announce when he will officially transfer his title to his son, he has hinted it could be within a month of elections.

Rainsy was dismissive of the planned transmission, saying the lack of a viable opposition in the election means the heir apparent Manet “will not have a democratic mandate to govern” when he eventually takes office. 

Hun Sen has said publicly that he intends to play an active role in statecraft after his son takes over. Though the transition in the top office will be the first of its kind in modern Cambodian history, it is unclear how much governance within the Kingdom will change. 

Mat Rodrath left his home in the Muslim section of the capital’s Chroy Changvar district at 5 a.m. to join the city-wide motorcade. Rodrath lauded Manet’s education at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, saying he’s the most qualified for premiership among the ruling party’s younger echelon.

The 40-year-old supporter also echoed Hun Sen’s long-time political stumping point, his “Win-Win Policy”, which ended the civil war with the Khmer Rouge with a mass amnesty programme. The prime minister had started his career as a young cadre of the communist movement but defected to Vietnam to escape its later purges. He returned to Cambodia with the 1979 Vietnamese invasion, a response to border incursions by the virulently xenophobic Khmer Rouge, and rose through the ranks of the single-party state established under the subsequent Vietnamese occupation.

When the Vietnamese military left Cambodia in 1989, the government led by Hun Sen in Phnom Penh shouldered the fight against the remaining communist insurgency. His faction’s eventual victory in that conflict has been key to the political currency of the CPP and his own personal brand. Though this legacy might be less salient to young Cambodians, Hun Sen and his supporters have long pointed to the spectre of conflict, both in the past and in an imagined future, when promoting CPP rule.

“My parents went through the war for three years, eight months and twenty days,” said Rodrath, as rain swept Phnom Penh, dousing him and thousands of other supporters. “I’ve come to support [the party] because I don’t want war.”

The post With motorcade, Cambodia’s ruling party marks expected election victory appeared first on Southeast Asia Globe.

The 250-member upper house of the parliament is seen as a key bastion of the conservative establishment opposed to Pita and his progressive party. In the 13 July vote, senators made a muted show of rejection – while 34 voted directly against Pita, 159 abstained while 43 either didn’t vote or failed to show up to the session altogether. 

Move Forward emerged as the surprise victor in the May election, winning more than 14 million votes. The flat refusal to seat Pita, who is facing a raft of legal challenges, is seen by many Thais as a direct refutation of the will of the people. This has led to growing street protests – including a rally last week of 500 cars and motorbikes parading through the streets of Bangkok – and online campaigns attempting to expose senators for misbehaviours ranging from shady financial dealings to extramarital affairs. 

Amidst the public challenges to the Senate, Move Forward has pressed to amend the constitution in order to exclude the senators from participating in the prime minister selection process altogether. Political analysts expect such mobilisations to increase as the elected opposition struggles against conservative headwinds to form a new government, but also thought it unlikely for such demonstrations to change minds in the military-backed Senate. 

Demonstrations against institutions perceived to be authoritarian are not new in Thailand, but this is the first time such protests have been targeted squarely at the unelected upper house, said Napon Jatusripitak, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

“As far as I know there haven’t been any significant protests against the Senate acting as the representative of the bureaucracy or the establishment,” he said. “I think this is a very new phenomenon, and it has been brought to light only because the Senate has been voting directly against the popular view.”

Fear of precisely this kind of public backlash was likely what drove the majority of senators to abstain on 13 July rather than vote against Pita, noted Termsak Chalermpalanupap, who is also with ISEAS–Yusof Ishak as a coordinator of the Thai studies programme.

“Some of them didn’t want to be seen opposing Pita openly, because there are costs,” Termsak said. 

Many senators justified their decision to abstain as based on personal conviction that the Senate should not be involved in selecting the prime minister, said Ken Mathis Lohatepanont, a PhD researcher at the University of Michigan in the U.S.

“They have argued that they are abstaining because they do not want to participate in the selection of the prime minister, in accordance with calls that the Senate ‘turn off the switch’ and refrain from exercising this power,” he stated. “Of course, this doesn’t actually make life easier for Pita because the constitution requires 375 affirmative votes; abstentions do not help Pita get over the line.”

In response to such statements from senators, the Move Forward Party has offered the lawmakers an opportunity to put that rhetoric into action. On 14 July, just a day after failing in their first attempt at the premiership, the party submitted a draft amendment to the constitution to remove Section 272 – the item that empowers the Senate to participate in the prime minister selection process.

In the public realm, attempts by senators to insulate themselves from criticism have proven ineffective so far. For much of the Thai public, there appears to be no difference between a non-vote or abstention and an explicit rejection of Pita’s premiership bid.

Online protestors have begun to dig into the senators’ histories, looking to unearth past activities seen as immoral or even criminal in order to publicly shame them. They have also taken to Twitter with the hashtag #ธุรกิจสว, or “Senator’s business”, to call for boycotts of businesses linked to senators and their families. Within hours of the 13 July vote, the campaign was already the top trending hashtag on Thai Twitter.

Some senators have attempted to fight back against the online pressure campaign, calling it a “witch hunt” and threatening online critics with defamation charges. However, these attempts are unlikely to dissuade online criticism, said James Buchanan, an independent analyst of Thai politics.

“[Once] these things go viral on Twitter and Facebook,” he said, “although they might try, it’s not going to do anything to stop the tide of criticism.”

While the Senate may be powerless to stem the wave of public outrage their votes have unleashed, the Thai public and Move Forward are likely equally powerless to change outcomes in the upper house, according to Napon.

“I don’t see protests as playing a significant role in shaping the Senate’s vote choice, since they have already demonstrated their stance on 13 July,” he said.

This impotence of public pressure to impact the Senate’s voting behaviour was on full display during the 19 July vote to determine whether Pita would be allowed to repeatedly submit himself as a candidate for prime minister, which he lost by even more votes than his initial premiership bid.

The Move Forward Party’s attempt to amend Section 272 of the constitution has equally slim chances of succeeding without the support of other parties in its embattled coalition, observed Termsak. 

“Pheu Thai already said it is not supporting [the amendment], and that this is the Move Forward Party’s own initiative taken without consultation in the eight-party coalition,” he said, noting that Move Forward’s coalition partners would likely abstain if the amendment came to a vote.

The chances of Move Forward finding enough votes for their constitutional amendment in the Senate are also low, despite the stated positions and past voting records of many senators on the issue.

“In the past, [during] the first attempt to amend this constitution, this particular provision, there were 56 senators who supported the idea [of revoking Section 272],” said Termsak, though he thought it was unlikely these senators would vote the same way at this time.

In the end, it may be pressure on the senators from their peers, rather than from the public or from elected members of parliament, that plays the more significant role in determining how senators vote in the future, he added.  

“[There’s] a lot of pressure among their peers, among senators,” Termsak said. “These senators have their own very tight-knit connections, and they depend on each other for patronage, and that is a very valuable patronage connection [they] must try to preserve.”

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